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ALWAYS LOW PRICES, ALWAYS AT A
COST: A CALL TO ARMS AGAINST THE
WAL-MARTIZATION OF AMERICA
JUSTIN

R. WATKINS*

Bigness is no crime, although "size is itself an earmark of
monopoly power. For size carries with it an opportunity for
abuse."'
INTRODUCTION

Every thirty-six hours Wal-Mart, Inc. roles out the red carpet
for a brand new Wal-Mart Supercenter,2 the combination
retail/grocery store that has become the cornerstone of shopping
centers across the nation.3 By the end of January 2005, there were
1713 of these goliaths4 nationwide.' However, that is only half the
The author dedicates this article to his loving wife,
Haley B. Watkins,
for providing the constant support and encouragement without which the
article would not have been possible, and to his parents Debra A. Anderssen
and Mark R. Watkins for teaching him that through hard work and
perseverance it is possible to prevail against even great odds.
1. United States v. N.Y. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79, 87 (7th
Cir. 1949) (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 174
(1948)).
2. See
WAL-MART,
2005
ANNUAL
REPORT
17,
available at
http://www.walmartstores.com/Files/ 2005AnnualReport.pdf [hereinafter WALMART 2005] (indicating that Wal-Mart, Inc. opened 242 new Supercenters in
FY 2005, or approximately one new Supercenter every thirty-six hours).
Journalist John Dicker estimates the rate is one new Supercenter every
thirty-eight hours. JOHN DICKER, THE UNITED STATES OF WAL-MART 2 (2005).
However, Dicker relied on information gleaned from Wal-Mart, Inc.'s Annual
Report for 2004 and his rate is therefore slightly dated. Id. at 2 n.1.
3. Only five states in the Union can boast of the absence of a Supercenter
within their borders: Alaska, Hawaii, New Jersey, North Dakota and
Vermont. WAL-MART 2005, supra note 2, at 53. However, there are thirtyfour states with more than ten Supercenters, twenty-eight with more than
twenty, and fourteen with more than fifty. Id. Texas takes the cake with an
incredible 219 Supercenters statewide. Id.
4. Each Supercenter demands about 187,000 square feet of space in order
to conduct operations. WAL-MART, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 18, available at
http://www.walmartstores.com/Files/annualreport_2004. pdf [hereinafter WALMART 2004]. Notably, the Wal-Mart Supercenter is about twice the size of the
vintage Wal-Mart Discount Store, which averages a comparatively modest
98,000 square feet. Id.
5. WAL-MART 2005, supra note 2.
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story - or rather, less than half. As of 2005, Wal-Mart, Inc.
operates 1353 discount stores, 551 Sam's Clubs and 85
Neighborhood Markets along with the 1713 Supercenters
nationwide, for a grand total of 3702 stores rolling back prices on a
daily basis.6 These numbers equate to an extremely powerful
position within the United States retail and grocery markets, a
position fraught with opportunity for abuse.
Recently, the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company ("A&P")
has been graced by one commentator with the honorary title of
"the Wal-Mart of its day."7 Such a reference is indicative of the
level of historical prominence to which Wal-Mart, Inc. has risen.8
Unfortunately for Wal-Mart, Inc., this does not present an occasion
for celebration. The success A&P realized during the early half of
the 20th century and, more importantly, the manner in which
A&P realized that success, had serious consequences - namely, a
damaging antitrust lawsuit in the latter part of the 1940s."0
This comment will explore the powerful position Wal-Mart,
Inc. occupies within the United States' retail and grocery markets
and the consequences emerging from the abuse of that position.
Part I discusses Wal-Mart, Inc. - past, present, and future. Part
II provides a brief overview of the history and present state of
antitrust jurisprudence in the United States. Part III engages in a
cost-benefit analysis of the powerful position occupied by WalMart, Inc., scrutinizing the social costs and social benefits under
the competing conceptions of antitrust jurisprudence. Finally,
Part IV proposes that Wal-Mart, Inc. is the modern manifestation
of the fears underlying the principles embodied in the Sherman
6. Id. at 53. Wal-Mart, Inc. also operates 1587 international stores. Id.
7. DICKER, supra note 2, at 161; see also Steve Lohr, Is Wal-Mart Good for
America?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003, at 1 (referring to A&P as "the Wal-Mart of
its time"); Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist
Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940, 90
IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1087-89 (2005) (noting similarities between public
sentiment toward Wal-Mart, Inc. today, and toward A&P in the 1920s and
1930s).
8. See Anthony Bianco & Wendy Zellner, Is Wal-Mart Too Powerful?, Bus.

WK., Oct. 6, 2003, at 100 (asserting that Wal-Mart, Inc. is bigger than any
retailer has ever been); Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart, a Nation Unto Itself,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2004, at 7 (declaring that the reach and influence of WalMart, Inc. is greater than that of any other retailer in history).
9. See DICKER, supra note 2, at 161 (noting that by the mid-20th century
"[A&PI had become the largest retailer in the world, bested only by General
Motors as the nation's largest corporation").
10. United States v. N.Y. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (1946),
affd 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949); N.Y. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79.
But cf ROBERT S. TEDLOW, NEW AND IMPROVED: THE STORY OF MASS

MARKETING IN AMERICA 224-25 (1990) (noting that even though the antitrust
litigation against A&P had the potential to utterly destroy it, A&P walked
away from the litigation largely intact, entering into a consent decree with the
more congenial Eisenhower administration in 1954).
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Antitrust Act, and accordingly, should be held accountable for
violation of the antitrust law. This comment insists that in order
to avoid the Wal-Martization of America, both antitrust scholars
and courts must adopt an antitrust jurisprudence that recognizes
the important role non-economic values played in the passage of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.
I. WAL-MART, INC. - PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
A. The Birth of the Bentonville Behemoth
The first "Wal-Mart" opened in Rogers, Arkansas in 1962."
However, Wal-Mart's creator Sam Walton laid the foundation for
Wal-Mart, Inc. seventeen years earlier in nearby Newport,
Arkansas with the success of a novel concept applied to the sale of
panties: 2 "Buy low, sell low, and as a result sell more."13 Though it
was unclear at the time how fundamental this concept would later
become to the daily operations of Wal-Mart, Inc.," the success it
achieved with the sale of panties planted the seed for what has
become the maxim of Wal-Mart, Inc. - "Always Low Prices.
Always."'"
In 1945, Sam Walton, creator of Wal-Mart, Inc., became the
proprietor of a Ben Franklin five-and-dime franchise owned by the
Chicago-based Butler Brother's 6 in the town of Newport.17 From
11. SAM WALTON WITH JOHN HuEY, Sam Walton: MADE IN AMERICA 57-58
(Bantam Books 1993) (1992); DICKER, supra note 2, at 43; Walmartstores.com,

The Story of Wal-Mart, http'//www.walmartstores.com (follow "Our Company"
hyperlink; then follow "Student Research Information" hyperlink; then follow
"The Story of Wal-Mart" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 23, 2006).
12. See WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 11, at 32. ("If you're interested in
'how Wal-Mart did it,' this is one story you've got to sit up and pay close
attention to."); see also DICKER, supra note 2, at 34 (stating that "Panty-ology"
was merely the first success on the road to the mantra of the Wal-Mart, Inc.
business strategy "Everyday Low Prices").
13. DICKER, supra note 2, at 34. As Walton explains, "say [a businessman
buys] an item for 80 cents. [He finds] that by pricing it at $1.00 [he can] sell
three times more of it than by pricing it at $1.20. [He] might make only half
the profit per item, but because [he is] selling three times as many, the overall
profit was much greater. Simple enough." WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note
11, at 32-33. Another successful Arkansan might have put it more directly,
"It's the volume, stupid." DICKER, supra note 2, at 34.
14. See WALTON WITH HuEY, supra note 11, at 32 (averring that it was
Walton's experiment with panties that first got Walton thinking along the
lines of what eventually became the foundation of Wal-Mart, Inc.'s
philosophy); DICKER, supra note 2, at 34 (suggesting that though Walton had
no idea how powerful this concept would become, the seed had been sown).
15. This mantra, or a variation, is likely to be seen on the fagade of every
Wal-Mart Discount Store and Supercenter, every price tag, sale sign, banner,
receipt, and nearly anything else boasting the Wal-Mart logo.
16. See DICKER, supra note 2, at 33 (reporting that the Ben Franklin chain
was a rapidly growing franchise store in the postwar era that carried a variety
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the outset, Walton chafed at corporate policy, 8
defying it
whenever possible 9 and implementing his own ideas. Chief among
these ideas was cutting deals directly with small wholesalers in
order to undercut the prices offered through the warehouses of
Walton's corporate sponsor."
It was this ruse which lead to
Walton's panty experiment.
Seeking the best deal, Walton
arranged for the supply of satin, elastic-waist panties at two
dollars a dozen, fifty cents less than he was paying Butler
Brother's.2 Cheap panties in hand, Walton undercut the Butler
Brother's price of three for a dollar with a steal at four for a
dollar.22 Needless to say, panties sold at a premium.' As the
volume of panty sales rose, so did profits, profits that would not
have been realized but for the low prices. In short, if Wal-Mart
were a religion, Book II of the Bible of Wal-Martology would open

of low-priced goods - from toys and games to health and beauty supplies and was a staple of southern and mid-western towns in 1945).
17. WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 11, at 29; DICKER, supra note 2, at 33.

18. Butler Brothers required all Ben Franklin operators to purchase eighty
percent of their stock directly from the company. DICKER, supra note 2, at 34.
Moreover, Butler Brothers left very little to the discretion of the operator,
dictating "what merchandise to sell, how much to sell it for, and how much
they would sell it to [the operator] for." WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 11, at
30. Butler Brothers wanted operators to do things by the book; they had their
own accounting system and provided manuals to operators telling them what
to do. Operators had merchandise statements, accounts-payable sheets,
profit-and-loss sheets, ledger books used to compare the current year's sales
with the last year's sales on a day to day basis - everything an independent
operator needed. Id.
19. See WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 11, at 31 (asserting that at the
very beginning, Walton ran the store by the book, but that it did not take him
long to start experimenting - it was in his nature); see also id. at 61
(declaring that in contrast to some of Walton's other core values - church,
family, civic leadership and politics - where he was a self-proclaimed "pretty
conservative guy," when it came to business, he was "driven to buck the
system").
20. See WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 11, at 31 (noting that Walton
would haggle with manufacturers, telling them he wanted to buy from them
directly and avoid paying Butler Brothers twenty-five percent more for the
same goods). Walton went to great lengths to cut the deal, often crossing the
state line and traveling into Tennessee, only to return with a car and trailer
stuffed with whatever goods he could find for a deal. Id.; DICKER, supra note
2, at 34-35.
21. WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 11, at 32.
22. Id.; DICKER, supra note 2, at 34.

23. See DICKER, supra note 2, at 34 (averring that the panties "flew out the
door").
24. Id.; see also WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 11, at 33 (proclaiming that
a retailer earns far more profit by selling an item at a cheap price, than by
selling it at a higher price as a consequence of the increased volume of sales
the cheaper price stimulates).
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with, "Low prices begat increased Sales, increased Sales begat
Profits. . ."" and increased profits begat expansion.
Expansion, however, would not spring from Newport. After
losing the lease on his Newport Ben Franklin store, 6 Walton
sought to ply his business acumen elsewhere: enter Bentonville,
Arkansas." "Walton's 5V and 10o " " became a laboratory for more
experiments.29 Most important to the future of Walton's business
endeavors - and frankly, to the future of retail - was selfservice." Having gleaned the idea off two Ben Franklin stores in
Minnesota,' Walton successfully employed it in his Bentonville
operation."2 By the mid-fifties, Walton was deploying his proven
business skills across the state of Arkansas, opening Ben Franklin

25. See DICKER, supra note 2, at 34 (stating that "volume begat profits").
The opening of Book I might read: First Sam made profits from low prices, and
Sam saw that the profits were good. Then Sam said "Let there be a place
where the consumer can find low prices everyday," and there was such a place,
and Sam called it Wal-Mart.
26. The success of Walton's Ben Franklin franchise raised a lot of eyebrows,
particularly those of Walton's landlord. Impressed with the success of the
store and knowing that there was nowhere else in Newport to move the store,
Walton's landlord decided not to renew the lease on the property where the
Ben Franklin was located, deciding to give the store to his son instead.
WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 11, at 38.

27. See WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 11, at 40-41 (noting that the loss of
the Ben Franklin was probably a blessing, giving Walton a chance for a new
start, and that Bentonville was the right place for Walton to prove that he
could succeed all over again).
28. "Walton's 5V and 10€" is now a museum devoted to Wal-Mart, Inc., and
is one of the only businesses that remains open in Bentonville's town square.
DICKER, supra note 2, at 41.
29. Id. at 42. It might be more appropriate to refer to his "experiments" as
"bootlegged concepts," many of them having been merely plagiarized from
other retailers. Id. at 41; see also infra text accompanying notes 57-58.
Walton himself preferred they be called "borrowed" ideas. WALTON WITH
HUEY, supra note 11, at 102. Either way, "[Walton] was like that kid in class
who always had the latest toy a good month before anyone had even heard of
it." DICKER, supra note 2, at 42.
30. In the 1950s, retail stores used clerks to serve customers directly,
pulling requested merchandise off shelves behind long counters, similar to the
remaining vestige of this practice found in the jewelry and cosmetic sections of
modern department stores. DICKER, supra note 2, at 42. Employing selfservice was indeed a radical move in the 1950s - when Walton did so at his
Bentonville store - it became only the third self-service store of its kind in the
whole country. WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 11, at 43.
31. After reading an article about the brand new concept introduced by the
two Ben Franklins in Minnesota, Walton hopped a bus and made the 600-mile
trek north to Minnesota to check it out for himself. DICKER, supra note 2, at
42. Liking what he saw, he decided to deploy the concept at his Bentonville
store. WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 11, at 42.
32. See WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 11, at 43 ("The [customers] turned
out, and they kept coming .... [Tihat store took off just like Newport had and
turned into a good business right away.").
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stores in Little Rock, Siloam Springs, and Fayetteville.n By 1960,
Walton's Ben Franklin operation had grown to fifteen stores across
Arkansas and neighboring Kansas.'
Then, a red letter day in
retail: July 2, 1962, Samuel Walton opened Wal-Mart Discount
City in Rogers, Arkansas.35 The rest, as they say, is history.
B. From Successful Retailer to Retail Exemplar
From its fifteen acre complex in Bentonville, Arkansas,' WalMart, Inc. utilizes some of the most advanced technology in the
retail market"7 combined with the largest private satellite system
in the world' to ensure that operations across all 3702 stores run
according to plan.'
For instance, if a Supercenter in Aurora,
Colorado finds itself suddenly subjected to unseasonal belowfreezing temperatures, techies in Bentonville will ensure that the
temperature inside the store does not change; ° if an unwelcome
customer is peddling a stolen credit card at the seven discount
stores in the "Biggest Little State in the Union,"' Bentonville will
be notified via satellite;" and, if a Supercenter in Valparaiso,
Indiana suddenly experiences an influx in the demand for ping
pong balls, Bentonville will ensure supply is there to meet

33. DICKER, supra note 2, at 42.
34. WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 11, at 52-53. Walton's regional chain
of fifteen stores made him Ben Franklin's largest franchisee.
DON
SODERQUIST, THE WAL-MART WAY 3 (2005).
35. WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 11, at 57. 1962 was indeed a red-letter
year for retail. Not only did Arkansas give birth to Wal-Mart, Inc., but
Michigan birthed a chain known as Kmart, Dayton Hudson brought Target to
Minnesota, the New York-based Woolworth's debuted Woolco, and in
Argentina, the world witnessed the birth of a new kind of beast when France
introduced Carrefour, the colossal hybrid grocery/retail store that would be the
progenitor of the Wal-Mart Supercenter. DICKER, supra note 2, at 43.
36. WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 11, at 114. The Wal-Mart, Inc.
complex is becoming the centerpiece of what could be termed a corporate
village, as Benton county is now home to hundreds of Wal-Mart, Inc.'s
suppliers that have migrated to what has become one of the fastest growing
counties in America in order to "service the account." DICKER, supra note 2, at
70.
37. See SODERQUIST, supra note 34, at 143-45 (reporting that the Wal-Mart,
Inc. information database is the largest commercial or private database in the
world, storing the information for all Wal-Mart, Inc. systems); DICKER, supra
note 2, at 69 (suggesting that Wal-Mart, Inc.'s database "contains more data
than the entire internet").
38. DICKER, supra note 2, at 68.
39. See SODERQUIST, supra note 34, at 147 ("The Wal-Mart Information
Systems Division [supports] every single department in the company and is
the information and communication backbone of virtually all that [Wal-Mart
does].").
40. DICKER, supra note 2, at 68.
41. WAL-MART 2005, supra note 2, at 53.
42. DICKER, supra note 2, at 68.

2006]

Always Low Prices,Always at a Cost

demand. 3 Indeed, Wal-Mart, Inc.'s tremendous success in the
retail and grocery markets has as much to do with its use of
technology as its maniacal devotion to everyday low prices."
In 1977, Wal-Mart, Inc. made a revolutionary commitment to
the use of technology to streamline its business.45 This commitment took the form of a computer network run through
private phone lines that connect the company's stores and
distribution centers to a 16,000 square foot nerve center in
Bentonville in a continuous loop of sales, payroll information, bank
deposits, personnel records, and warehouse inventory."6
Eventually, Wal-Mart, Inc. brought nearly all of its suppliers into
the system that came to be known as "Electronic Data
Interchange" (EDI), tremendously increasing the efficiency of its
merchandising operations.47
The commitment continued with the debut of "point of sale"
scanners at registers in twenty-five stores in 1983, scanners which
ring up the price of an item by scanning the little black lines of an
Universal Product Code (UPC) affixed to the item.48 Moreover, in
1991, Wal-Mart, Inc. developed a software program called "Retail
Link," which gives suppliers remote access to the extensive WalMart, Inc. database. 9 This technology helps Wal-Mart, Inc. tailor
merchandising efforts on a store-by-store basis." This commit-

43. See SODERQUIST, supra note 34, at 145 (maintaining that the mass of
information contained in the Wal-Mart database permits Wal-Mart, Inc. "to
merchandise each store according to the specific needs of the customers who
shop in that particular store," and according to seasonal fluctuations unique to
each store). Indeed, Wal-Mart, Inc.'s advanced database is capable of meeting
a sudden demand for mops in Texas after heavy rains, or for pop-tarts in
Florida in preparation for a hurricane - the database can even recognize that
men buying diapers after work on Fridays were also taking home six-packs of
beer, and accommodate the need accordingly. DICKER, supra note 2, at 70.
44. DICKER, supra note 2, at 65.
45. Id. at 64.
46. Id. Today, Wal-Mart, Inc. has done away with the private phone lines,
using the internet instead. Id. at 65.
47. See SODERQUIST, supra note 34, at 143 (stating that the integration of
suppliers into EDI has considerably reduced time, errors, and costs by
enabling Wal-Mart, Inc. to transmit purchase orders for merchandise directly
to the manufacturers, and then receive its confirmation and invoices
electronically).
48. DICKER, supra note 2, at 67.
49. SODERQUIST, supra note 34, at 146.
50. 'Retail Link" helps increase efficiency and maximize performance
across the Wal-Mart, Inc. world by enabling suppliers to monitor the sales of
their items across the nation at varying levels of geographic specificity and
over different periods of time. Id. Moreover, the system employs thousands of
"traits" or variables to map out a profile of all 3702 Wal-Mart, Inc. stores
nationwide, which Wal-Mart, Inc. associates, as well as suppliers, can then
utilize to merchandise more effectively. DICKER, supra note 2, at 69.
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ment to technology continues today,5 ' and Wal-Mart, Inc. is
leading the way in the implementation of radio-frequency
identification (RFID), 52 the same technology that permits drivers
to pass through toll-ways without stopping,' and that has the
potential to revolutionize retail in a manner reminiscent to the
introduction of the barcode.'
In the 1980s, Wal-Mart, Inc. grew in stature from a mere
regional chain of 276 stores to a national player with 1528 stores
- a period of growth which catapulted sales from $1.2 to $26
billion.'
There can be little doubt that Wal-Mart, Inc.'s
commitment to the use of technology to streamline operations
played as much a part in this success as its commitment to
everyday low prices. Moreover, by streamlining operations and
increasing efficiency, Wal-Mart, Inc. was able to expand
operations, moving into markets in desperate need of a Wal-Mart
makeover.'
In 1983, Wal-Mart, Inc. created a wholesale club
division with the opening of the first Sam's Club. 7 In 1988, WalMart, Inc. dove headlong into the grocery business with the

51. Wal-Mart, Inc. shows no sign of complacency, indeed, it reminds its
associates of this everyday at the David Glass Technology Center as they walk
into the lobby and read the sign stating: "We must be inventing and
implementing faster than the competition is stealing." DICKER, supra note 2,
at 73.
52. See SODERQUIST, supra note 34, at 144 (stating that Wal-Mart, Inc.'s
Information Systems Division is "at the forefront of encouraging the retail
.industry to invest in (RFID)").
53. RFID Journal, RFID Consumer Applications and Benefits,
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1332/l129/ (last visited Dec. 28,
2006).
54. RFID has many potential time-saving and cost-saving applications for
retailers, such as: tracking lost or stolen assets, managing inventory,
improving supply chain efficiency, and, scanning multiple items or even the
contents of entire shopping carts at once during checkout. RFID Journal,
RFID Business Applications, http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/
1334/1/129/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2006).
55. DICKER, supra note 2, at 73.
56. See id. (noting that the spike in food prices in the 1980s, a consequence
of the makeup of a grocery market comprised largely of regional chains, could
not have been more fortuitous for the grocer in Wal-Mart, Inc., who was able
to undercut prices and learn the grocery business simultaneously).
57. WALTON WITH HUEY, supra note 11, at 255-56. Sam's Club was also a
bootlegged concept, gleaned from Sol Price's "Price Club" operation. Id.; see
also supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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introduction of its hybrid grocery/retail store, the Wal-Mart
Supercenter.' In 1998, Wal-Mart, Inc. unveiled the Neighborhood
Market, a chain with the modest goal of primarily serving the
grocery market.59 Efficiency has bred expansion, and expansion
has bred great success.
Today, Wal-Mart, Inc. is not only the biggest company
nationwide in terms of sales,' but it is also the biggest company
worldwide by that measure."' With close to $209 billion in
domestic sales in 2004,"2 Wal-Mart, Inc. already controlled nearly
ten percent of the United States' retail market.' Wal-Mart, Inc. is
now the nation's largest grocer - commanding nineteen percent of
the market share - the nation's largest toy-seller, largest
furniture retailer, and the third largest pharmacist.' Wal-Mart,
Inc. commands about thirty percent of the U.S. market in
household staples such as toothpaste, shampoo, and paper towels;
fifteen to twenty percent of all CDs, videos, and DVDs; as well as
fifteen percent of all single-copy sales of magazines.' Moreover,
with $285 billion in sales during fiscal year 2005, Wal-Mart, Inc. is
more than four times the size of its largest domestic rival Home
Depot;' five and a half times the size of Costco; 7 and six times the
size of Target.' In the decades since the first Wal-Mart Discount

59. DICKER, supra note 2, at 13.
60. See Lohr, supra note 7 (asserting that with $245 billion in sales in 2002,
Wal-Mart, Inc. was the largest corporation in America by that measure). WalMart, Inc. has since increased sales from $245 billion in 2002 to $285 billion in
2005. With $256 billion in sales in Fiscal Year 2004, Wal-Mart, Inc. was
already the world's largest company by that measure. How Big Can It Grow?
- Wal-Mart, ECONOMIST, Apr. 17, 2004 [hereinafter How Big Can It Grow?].
In Fiscal Year 2005, Wal-Mart increased that measure by almost $29 billion.
WAL-MART 2005, supra note 2, at 11.
61. See Bianco & Zellner, supra note 8 (asserting that in terms of sales,
Wal-Mart, Inc. was the world's largest company in 2002); see also text
accompanying note 60.
62. WAL-MART 2004, supra note 4, at 19.
63. Id. at 2.
64. Bianco & Zellner, supra note 8.
65. Id.
66. DICKER, supra note 2, at 24. In fiscal year 2004 (ending January 30,
2005), Home Depot did $73 billion in sales. Home Depot, 2004 ANNUAL
REPORT 24, available at http'J/ir.homedepot.com/downloads/HD_2004_AR.pdf
(last visited Dec. 28, 2006).
67. In fiscal year 2004, Costco estimated over $47 billion in sales, which
increased ten percent to nearly $52 billion in fiscal year 2005. Costco.com,
COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION REPORTS AUGUST, FOURTH QUARTER AND
FISCAL YEAR 2005 SALES RESULTS, available at http'J/phx.corporateir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=83830&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=751438&highlight=
(last visited Dec. 28, 2006).
68. In 2004, Target estimated $46 billion in sales. Targetcorp.com, 2004
ANNUAL REPORT 37, available at http'J/targetcorp.comtargetcorp-group/
investor-relations/investor-relations.jhtml (follow "Annual Reports" hyperlink;
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City opened in Rogers, Arkansas, Wal-Mart, Inc. has become the
industry standard - a force to be reckoned with.
C. Wal-Mart, Inc. IS the Future
On the twenty mile stretch of road between Scottsdale and
Surprise, Arizona, the future of American retail has arrived.
Indeed, on this single stretch of American thoroughfare, the casual
observer will notice six giant Wal-Mart, Inc. stores, all doing
reasonable business.69 However, for this small area in the Valley
of the Sun, six Wal-Mart stores are simply not enough and within
a few miles south and east of the thoroughfare, shoppers have
fourteen more Wal-Mart, Inc. stores at their disposal.'
In the
words of Wal-Mart, Inc.'s chief financial officer, Tom Schoewe, the
area "shows you what can happen."7'
Wal-Mart, Inc. is the future - the future of retail, the future
of groceries and, more pointedly, the future of the United States.
Wal-Mart, Inc. estimates that the country can handle nearly 4000
more Wal-Mart Supercenters before the market reaches saturation
- more than tripling the current number." The share of the U.S.
retail and grocery markets that would shift to Wal-Mart, Inc. as a
result of this expansion alone is not clear, but what is clear is that
Wal-Mart, Inc. intends to find out.73 More surreptitiously, WalMart, Inc. is expanding into more than just the grocery market, 4
seeking out footholds in the gasoline," banking, 6 car-rental,77
then follow "2004 Annual Report" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 28, 2006).
69. How Big Can It Grow?, supra note 60.
70. Id. The twenty Wal-Mart Superstores in this small area of desert
account for less than one-third of the Wal-Mart stores in the Grand Canyon
State. Wal-Mart, Inc. operates a total of sixty-seven Wal-Mart stores in
Arizona: eighteen Wal-Mart Discount Stores, thirty-three Wal-Mart Supercenters, eleven Sam's Clubs, and five Neighborhood Markets. WAL-MART
2005, supra note 2, at 53.
71. How Big Can It Grow?, supra note 60.
72. WAL-MART 2005, supra note 2, at 12.
73. See id. (downplaying Wal-Mart, Inc.'s success in order to emphasize
how much room the company has to grow both in the U.S. and around the
world); How Big Can It Grow?, supra note 60 (highlighting Wal-Mart, Inc.'s
recent establishment of a reputation task-force, introduction of new personnel
procedures, hiring of extra lobbyists in Washington, D.C., creation of an office
of diversity, and launching of new public-relations and advertising campaigns
as actions of a company with no intention of getting smaller).
74. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing Wal-Mart,
Inc.'s expansion into the grocery market with the introduction of the
Supercenter in 1998).
75. See DICKER, supra note 2, at 12 (reporting that Wal-Mart, Inc.'s parking
lots across the nation are now host to hundreds of gas stations generating
rents and increased traffic).
76. See id. (remarking that Wal-Mart, Inc. stores will cash checks and wire
money for consumers at well below the market rate).
77. See id. (observing that in Birmingham, Alabama, Budget operates its
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MP3,78 and caffeine 79 markets. The United States of Wal-Mart8 °
may not be a forgone conclusion, but it is certainly a potential
reality.
II.

ANTITRUST LAW -

CONFLICTS AND CONTRADICTIONS

A. The Patent and Latent Ambiguity of
Sections 1 & 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890
Antitrust law in the United States begins and ends with the
text of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890."'
Unfortunately,
everything in between is left up for debate." Section one of the
Sherman Act proclaims:
Every contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States... is hereby declared to be
illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation .... 83

Section two of the Sherman Act proclaims:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a
corporation .... 84

Thus, the plain language of the Sherman Act makes "every
contract, combination..., or conspiracy in restraint of trade" a
felony, and deems every person who does or seeks to "monopolize"
a felon. However, the ambiguous phrases "in restraint of trade"
and "monopolize" are left undefined - in essence, the Act defines
prohibited conduct without specifying what kind of conduct is

car rental service within the friendly confines of a Wal-Mart, Inc. store).
78. See Walmart.com, Music Downloads, http://www.walmart.conLcatalog
catalog.gsp?cat=4104 (offering 880 music downloads on over one million songs)
(last visited Dec. 28, 2006).
79. See DICKER, supra note 2, at 12 (reporting that in a Wal-Mart, Inc.
store in Plano, Texas, customers can have freshly brewed "Kicks Coffee" hand
delivered to them in the aisles while they shop).
80. DICKER, supra note 2.
81. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 48 (2d ed. 1999) (IT]he Sherman Act... has
always been the driving force in American antitrust policy.").
82. See id. at 48-49 (stressing that the ambiguous and open-ended language
that comprises the legislative history of the Sherman Act is not very helpful in
clearing up the ambiguity inherent in the Act itself).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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prohibited.' The judiciary, then, is left with the thankless task of
discerning the meaning of these phrases from Congressional
intent.
Determining the Congressional intent underlying the
Sherman Antitrust Act requires an examination of the Act's
legislative history. Though such a task is beyond the scope of this
comment, it is not an endeavor that has been left ignored by
academia. The pursuit for ultimate Congressional intent has not,
however, resulted in uniformity of thought among antitrust
Rather, the search has drawn a line in the
jurisprudents.
proverbial sand between two competing "camps of thought"
regarding the proper formulation of Congressional intent.17 The
first camp is home to those who view allocative efficiency as the
exclusive goal of antitrust policy and might aptly be termed the
The second camp would subordinate
"Efficiency Camp."'
efficiency goals to other consumer values and might broadly be
termed the "Protectionist Camp."89 A brief examination of these
85. HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 47; see also EARL W. KINTNER, AN
ANTITRUST PRIMER: A GUIDE TO ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION LAWS

FOR BUSINESSMEN 15-16 (2d ed. 1973) (averring that though the Sherman Act
clearly sets forth the result it seeks to prevent, it fails to further define the
specific types of behavior which are affirmatively forbidden).
86. See KINTNER, supra note 85, at 15-16 (noting that the task of defining
the meaning of the Sherman Act was left to the judiciary, to be resolved on a
case-by-case basis).
87. Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1982).
88. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx: A POLICY AT WAR

WITH ITSELF 90-91 (Free Press 1993) (alleging that the objective of antitrust is
to "preserve, improve, and reinforce the powerful economic mechanisms that
compel businesses to respond to consumers"); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 4 (1976) (claiming that the only goal of
antitrust law should be the promotion of efficiency).
89. See Albert A. Foer & Robert H. Lande, The Evolution of United States
Antitrust Law: The Past Present, and (Possible) Future, 16 NIHON UNIV.
COMPARATIVE L.J. 149 (2004), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.
org/archives/files/64.pdf, at 18 (asserting that a proper antitrust policy
promotes not only efficiency and innovation, but also seeks to protect
consumer choice and prevent consumers from paying artificially high prices;
referring to their model as the "consumer protection regime"); Eleanor M. Fox,
The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV.
1140, 1178 (1980) (rejecting the claim that the exclusive concern of antitrust
law should be efficiency as contrary to antitrust jurisprudence); Robert H.
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust:
The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 96 (1982)
(arguing that the principal concern underlying the passage of the Sherman
Antitrust Act was preventing unfair transfers of wealth - such as denying
consumers the right to competitively priced products - away from consumers
by firms with market power); Louis B. Schwartz, 'Justice" and Other NonEconomic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1076 (1979) (recognizing
that a broad range of legislative history instructs against the premise that
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two camps will shed some light on the current state of antitrust
jurisprudence.'
1. The Efficiency Camp
Possibly one of the most influential examinations of the
legislative history of the Sherman Antitrust Act was performed by
now Judge Bork while he was a professor at Yale Law School. 1
Based on his examination of the Congressional Record, Bork
concluded that the sole intent of Congress in enacting the
Sherman Antitrust Act was the maximization of "consumer
welfare."92 Within the Efficiency Camp, maximizing consumer
efficiency is the exclusive goal of antitrust law and advocates in favor of
deference to non-economic goals).
90. Dividing antitrust jurisprudence into two general camps is appropriate
insofar as it serves the purpose of presenting a general overview of antitrust
thought, however, such a division is not meant to be dispositive of antitrust
jurisprudence - indeed, there are several theories regarding the proper
formulation of the Congressional intent underlying the Sherman Act which do
not find themselves within the confines of the two camps discussed. See
WILLIAM F. SHUGHART, II, ANTITRUST POLICY AND INTEREST GROUP POLITICS
11-12 (1990) (discussing the position that the Sherman Act was a victory for
the non-consumer interests of farmers). See also generally George L. Stigler,
The Origin of the Sherman Act, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 (1985) (presenting
evidence that the passage of the Sherman Act was influenced, at least in part,
by the non-consumer interests of small business).
91. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9
J.L. ECON. 7 (1966). Bork's examination was a response to what he perceived
as "irresponsibility in the judicial process" hallmarked by the application of
non-economic values as a deus ex machina for the difficult, but proper
application of the economic analysis and judgment the Sherman Act requires.
Id. at 7-8. The examination was essentially a follow up to a previous article
written at a time when Bork "seriously underestimated the clarity of the
legislative intent behind the Sherman Act which a closer study of the full
record reveals." Id. at 7 n.1. See generally Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason
and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775,
829-47 (1965) (defending consumer welfare as the proper standard for the
administration of the Sherman Act).
92. BORK, supra note 88, at 7. It is unfortunate that Bork chose to give
meaning to ambiguity with a term that itself reeks of ambiguity. At first
glance the singular concept of consumer welfare is susceptible to definitions
distributive in nature. Indeed, the identification of a particular group as the
beneficiary of a policy meant to increase the welfare of that group at the
expense of others is essentially distributive. Hovenkamp, supra note 87, at 5.
However, the concept is also susceptible to conflicting definition as an
efficiency goal - a mechanism for improving the welfare of society as a whole.
Simply stated, because all members of society are consumers, a policy goal of
advancing consumer welfare is in essence an efficiency goal. Id.
In order to clarify the matter, Bork later defined consumer welfare as
"the wealth of the nation." BORK, supra note 88, at 90. Significantly, by
adopting the definition of consumer welfare as an efficiency goal, Bork and
others within the "Efficiency Camp" effectively remove consumer welfare from
the conflicting realm of distributive justice, an inefficient concept. See id.
(claiming that antitrust law has nothing to say about the distribution of
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welfare is synonymous with the achievement of economic
efficiency.93 Economic efficiency is maximized by increasing
allocative efficiency94 without decreasing productive efficiency95 to
such an extent that "no gain or a net loss" in the wealth of society
results.96 According to the Efficiency Camp, the Congressional
intent underlying the Sherman Antitrust Act is the maximization

wealth); POSNER, supra note 88, at 4 (contending that the protection of small
business is the only other goal identified by the legislative history of the
Sherman Act, but that such a goal cannot be realized under the principles and
procedures of antitrust law).
Yet even clarified as merely a simile for the welfare of society as a
whole, the concept of consumer welfare remains couched in ambiguity. This
becomes abundantly clear when one considers the reality that consumer
welfare frequently is defined by consumer citizens on the basis of different and
often conflicting consumer values (such as quality versus low price), inevitably
leading to outcomes in which policy decisions improve the welfare of one group
of consumers at the expense of others. See Hovenkamp, supra note 87, at 5-8
(discussing the inadequacy of the definition of consumer welfare as the wealth
of society as a whole). Thus, Bork's clarification of consumer welfare as the
wealth of society as a whole merely begs the question, leaving the concept
open to conflicting interpretations.
93. See Hovenkamp, supra note 87, at 4 (clarifying that those who claim
that the principle goal of the antitrust laws is the maximization of consumer
welfare are merely advancing the proposition that the exclusive goal of the
antitrust laws should be the promotion of economic efficiency).
94. Allocative efficiency as a concept refers to the arrangement of resources
that benefits society the most; thus, it "refers to the welfare of society as a
whole." HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 74. Scholars do not agree on the
proper definition, or rather, the proper arrangement of allocative efficiency.
However, for the purposes of this paper, allocative efficiency is best defined in
utilitarian terms. Thus, an increase in allocative efficiency occurs when the
total value of the gains accruing from a policy decision are greater than the
total losses. In economic terms, this is referred to as "potential Paretoefficiency." See id. at 74-75 (discussing the concept of allocative efficiency as
defined by potential Pareto-efficiency, a derivative concept of Paretooptimality and Pareto-superiority).
95. Productive efficiency, at its most basic, is simply a ratio of a business'
outputs to inputs. For example, a business that produces an output valued at
ten dollars from an input valued at eight dollars is more efficient than a
business that produces an output valued at ten dollars from an input valued at
nine dollars. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 74 (providing an example of a
productive efficiency ratio). In order to increase productive efficiency, a
business must either increase the value of the product or decrease the cost of
production, or both. Increased productive efficiency is generally achieved
through research and development. Id. at 60-61, 74.
96. See BORK, supra note 88, at 91 ("The whole task of antitrust can be
summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing
productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in
consumer welfare"); POSNER, supra note 88, at 4 (claiming that the
consequences of monopoly pricing - the result of artificially reducing
productive efficiency to drive price up - provides a prima facie case for
antitrust law).
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of net efficiency gains." In essence then, the Congressional intent
is utilitarian in nature.
The Efficiency Camp corresponds with what is known as the
"Chicago School" model of antitrust policy. 8 According to the
Chicago School, "[aintitrust enforcement should be designed in
such a way as to penalize conduct" only to the extent that "it is
inefficient."" In general, "markets attain optimal allocative
efficiency when... price equals marginal cost,""° in which case the
market is said to be competitive.10' However, the incentive to
increase profits inevitably motivates a company to increase
productive efficiency through research and development. 2
Increases in a firm's productive efficiency may lead to reductions
in allocative efficiency as the firm increases its market power and
If the
price beyond marginal cost, e.g. "monopoly pricing. " "
reduction in allocative efficiency is greater than the increase in
productive efficiency - resulting in a net loss in economic
efficiency, or rather, consumer welfare - antitrust law corrects
Conversely, if increases in productive efficiency
the situation.'
are greater than decreases in allocative efficiency - resulting in a
net efficiency gain - proper antitrust policy would militate
against intervention."° Such a situation would exist where a firm
obtains monopoly power but does not institute monopoly prices;
that is, where the efficient firm maintains prices at or near
marginal cost."° Accordingly, the Sherman Antitrust Act may be
read as guarding against inefficiency - conduct is violative of
sections one and two of the Act only when inefficiency results. 7
97. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV.
213, 226 (1985).
98. See id. at 215 (acknowledging that allocative efficiency is the exclusive

goal of antitrust law under the Chicago School model of antitrust policy).
99. HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 62.
100. Id. at 61.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 94-96 and associated text.
105. See Hovenkamp, supra note 97, at 231 (confirming that the Chicago
School supports policy initiatives that result in net efficiency gains).
106. See Bork, supra note 91, at 30 (propounding that monopoly by efficiency
is more beneficial to consumers than other policy alternatives, and that
breaking up a monopoly by efficiency would impose high costs on the
consumer); POSNER, supra note 88, at 22 (arguing that where the preservation
of monopoly would promote efficiency to the benefit of social welfare, not only
should monopoly be tolerated, it should be encouraged).
107. An important aspect of the Chicago School worth noting here is the
belief that markets tend to be self-correcting. Where a monopoly exists, as the
argument goes, the higher monopoly profits will attract new entrants into the
monopolized market, eroding the monopolist's market power and thus
eliminating the monopoly. HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 61. Accordingly,
under the Chicago School model, antitrust merely serves the purpose of
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2. The ProtectionistCamp
The Chicago School model of antitrust analysis assumed
dominance within antitrust jurisprudence during the 1970s and
1980s.l0 Since then, both the model and the Efficiency Camp
promoting it have been under attack by those who would
subordinate economic efficiency to other non-economic goals."u
This offensive has been spurned by a refutation of Bork's
supposition that the Congressional intent underlying the Sherman
Antitrust Act was exclusively the maximization of economic
efficiency.110 Contrary to Bork, many antitrust scholars have
drawn from the legislative history a multi-valued, "protectionist"

speeding up the process of self-correction. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits
of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984).
108. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 68 (associating the revision of
antitrust policy that took place in the 1970s and 1980s with the emergence of
the Chicago School as the prevailing economic model of antitrust analysis); see
also Foer & Lande, supra note 89, at 18 (referring to the antitrust policy
prominent in the 1970s and 1980s as the "efficiency regime").
109. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 69 (affirming the growing
prevalence of "post-Chicago" theories of antitrust analysis); Hovenkamp, supra
note 97, at 216 (maintaining that critics of the Chicago School model, not its
apologists, assumed the mantle of "cutting edge" within antitrust
jurisprudence during the mid-1980s); see also Foer & Lande, supra note 89, at
18 (recognizing the need for government action to protect markets in order to
facilitate the economic goal of efficiency, as well as the non-economic goals of
innovation and consumer choice, while avoiding artificially high prices); Fox,
supra note 89, at 1180-83 (discarding efficiency as the ultimate goal of
antitrust law and presenting it as an intermediate goal utilized to promote
other non-efficiency values by serving as a limiting principle, preventing the
application of antitrust law in a manner that threatens long-run consumer
interests); Lande, supra note 89, at 68 (asserting that Congress passed the
Sherman Antitrust Act primarily to further objectives of a distributive nature,
as opposed to the exclusive promotion of efficiency); Schwartz, supra note 89,
at 1077 (formulating the contention that the collective message of
Congressional legislation following the Sherman Antitrust Act portrays a
public interest in favor of small businesses, which must pervade the antitrust
laws).
110. Indeed, several antitrust scholars have been quick to point out that
even a cursory review of the historical context which inspired the passage of
the Sherman Antitrust Act makes it clear that Bork's supposition, at best,
stands on tenuous ground. See Hovenkamp, supra note 87, at 19 (rebuffing
the description of allocative efficiency as the exclusive concern underlying the
legislative history of the Sherman Act as an "extraordinarily narrow and
unrealistic view of the political process in our congressional system"); Fox,
supra note 89, at 1154 (evaluating the claim that efficiency is the exclusive
goal of antitrust law as "weak at best," and arguing that the basis on which
scholars within the Efficiency Camp have rejected non-efficiency values, such
as power dispersion, economic opportunity, and competition, cannot withstand
scrutiny); Lande, supra note 89, at 87-88 (averring that no basis exists
whatsoever for the position espoused by those within the Efficiency Camp that
Congress was concerned exclusively with the promotion of allocative
efficiency).
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approach to antitrust enforcement."' Scholars that fall into the
Protectionist Camp recognize that efficiency concerns played a role
in the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act," 2 but contend that
the central concern of Congress was the promotion of other noneconomic consumer values"' such as: preventing unfair transfers
of wealth away from consumers,14 protecting small businesses
from large competitors,"' curbing the accumulation of social and

111. See generally Fox, supra note 89, at 1176-83 (framing the view that
efficiency - defined in terms of long run consumer interests - is the central
purpose of antitrust law, but that socio-political values generally regarded as
non-efficiency goals do not conflict with the promotion of efficiency so defined);
Lande, supra note 89, at 67-106 (arguing that Congress passed the Sherman
Antitrust Act with the intention of subordinating all other concerns to the
general concern of protecting consumer interests against incursions from firms
with market power); Schwartz, supra note 89, at 1078-81 (stressing the
importance of congressional adherence to non-economic and non-qualitative
goals ofjustice, procedural fairness, and equal protection under the law in the
interpretation of the antitrust laws).
112. See Fox, supra note 89, at 1192 (concluding that a proper antitrust
policy should give due regard to the promotion of efficiency, but noting that
such regard should be tempered by a recognition of the "multivalued, flexible
charter" underlying antitrust law); Lande, supra note 89, at 105 (admitting it
was a central goal of Congress to promote efficiency, particularly when the
benefits passed to the consumer, but emphasizing that efficiency concerns
alone cannot explain why Congress passed the Sherman Act).
113. See Lande, supra note 89, at 105-06 (pointing out that Congress
condemned even efficient conduct in favor of non-economic values, and that
monopoly conduct was not to be permitted on the mere basis that the
monopolist would benefit from efficiency gains).
114. Id. at 68. An unfair transfer of wealth occurs when a firm with market
power unfairly acquires wealth rightfully entitled to consumers. Id. at 70.
Specifically, this entails the acquisition by firms of the consumer surplus, the
difference between the maximum amount a consumer would pay for a good
and the price actually paid. Id. at 70 n.18. Professor Lande provides a simple
example:
Suppose that widgets are priced at $2.00, the competitive price.
Marginal consumers of widgets would be willing to pay only this
amount. Some consumers, however, would particularly desire widgets
and willingly pay more - as much as $3.00. These consumers receive
$1.00 in consumers' surplus when they purchase the competitively
priced widgets. If a monopolist gained control of the widget market and
raised the price of widgets to $3.00, marginal consumers would no
longer purchase widgets, and nonmarginal consumers would lost [sic]
their surplus. The widget monopoly would acquire $1.00 of monopoly
profits at the expense of widget consumers.
Id.
115. See Fox, supra note 89, at 1153-54 (maintaining that the interests of
entrepreneurs and small businesses alike have been the "heart and lifeblood of
American free enterprise," and have been recurrent throughout the passage of
antitrust laws); Lande, supra note 89, at 104 (declaring that a desire to
maintain an economic environment in which small businesses could survive
underlies the passage of the Sherman Act).
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political power by large corporations, 1 6 promoting consumer
choice," ' and the general promotion of justice in business
practices." 8
Thus, from within the Protectionist Camp, the
Sherman Antitrust Act may be read as subordinating economic
efficiency to the generalized concern of preventing firms from
directly harming consumer interests" 9 - conduct violative of
sections one and two would include the inefficient conduct
condemned by the Chicago School, but would also include efficient
conduct that ultimately harms consumer interests more than it
benefits consumer interests.
B. The Judicial Camp - Antitrust Law in Flux
In general, the protectionist formulation accords more
precisely with the history of antitrust law than the Chicago School
formulation."' In fact, "[t]o this day, the Supreme Court has not
116. See Fox, supra note 89, at 1153 (declaring that the principle underlying
antitrust law is not the exclusive promotion of efficiency, but rather the
sustained dispersion of private power, and stressing that "distrust of power is
the one central and common ground that over time has unified support for
antitrust statutes"); Lande, supra note 89, at 106 (confirming that the
Sherman Act was a culmination of an effort to restrict the influence of private
interests with regard to economic, social, and political decision-making);
Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051
(1979) (insisting that "political values," such as guarding against the excessive
concentration of economic power, enhancing individual and business freedom,
and preventing the domination of the economy by a few giant corporations so
as to necessitate government intrusion into economic affairs, were meant to
play a role in the interpretation of antitrust laws).
117. See Foer & Lande, supra note 89, at 18 (maintaining that a proper
antitrust policy values markets that provide a range of consumer choices).
118. See Schwartz, supra note 89, at 1078 (suggesting that Congressional
concern for preserving competition may properly be viewed as a concern for
the non-economic goal of "justice,' in the sense of fair and equal treatment of
persons in like situations").
119. Lande, supra note 89, at 68-69; Fox, supra note 89, at 1190.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-75, n.7
(1966) ("'Throughout the history of [the antitrust] statutes it has been
constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and
preserve... in spite of possible cost, [small business].') (quoting United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945)); Brown
Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (stressing the responsibility of
the Court to give effect to the Congressional appreciation that "occasional
higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented
industries and markets" and the decision by Congress to resolve "these
competing considerations in favor of decentralization"); Fashion Originators'
Guild of America v. FTC., 312 U.S. 457, 467 (1941) ("[A] monopoly contrary to
[the] policies [of the Sherman and Clayton Acts] can exist even though a
combination may temporarily or even permanently reduce the price of the
articles manufactured or sold."); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S.
293, 309 (1949) (stressing that "the theory of the antitrust laws [is] that the
long-run advantage of the community depends upon the removal of restraints
upon competition" even in the face of greater efficiency and lower costs in the
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come close to saying that economic efficiency is the exclusive
concern of the antitrust laws. .,.12
Moreover, in one of the first
major Sherman Antitrust Act cases, Chief Justice White declared:
The debates.., conclusively show.., that the main cause which led
to the [Sherman Act] was the thought that it was required by the
economic condition of the times, that is, the vast accumulation of
wealth in the hands of corporations and individuals, the enormous
development of corporate organization, the facility for combination
which such organizations afforded, the fact that the facility was
being used, and that combinations known as trusts were being
multiplied, and the widespread impression that their power had
been and would 12be
exerted to oppress individuals and injure the
2
public generally.

Thus, early in the 20th century, the Supreme Court plainly
recognized the underlying purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act
as a means to combat the concentration of economic power in the
hands of the few. Nevertheless, the antitrust goals regarded as
inconsistent today - the primary achievement of economic
efficiency versus preventing unfair wealth transfers, preserving
small business, curbing the centralization of power, and protecting
consumer choice - were historically regarded as complimentary. 12' The position that particular goals could
only be advanced
1 2
at the expense of others was notably absent. 1

short-run); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933)
("The purpose of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is to prevent undue restraints of
interstate commerce, to maintain its appropriate freedom in the public
interest, to afford protection from the subversive or coercive influences of
monopolistic endeavor."); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U.S. 373, 409 (1911) (declining to follow the common law rule permitting
resale price maintenance - a contractual agreement between a manufacturer
and retailer requiring the resale of a product at a specified price - in favor of
a policy recognizing that the "public is entitled to whatever advantage may be
derived from competition in the subsequent traffic").
121. HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 69; see also Lande, supra note 89, 67 n.2

(commenting that the Supreme Court has determined that there are a variety
of goals underlying the antitrust laws).
122. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911); see also United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911) (maintaining that
the Sherman Act "embraced [the prohibition of] acts or contracts or
agreements or combinations which operated to the prejudice of the public
interests").
123. See James May, The Role of the States in the First Century of the
Sherman Act and the Larger Picture of Antitrust Policy, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 93,

104 (1990) (contrasting current perspectives regarding the conflicting goals of
antitrust law with the belief during the formative era that antitrust law
"simultaneously could protect economic opportunity, efficiency, competition,
fair distribution, and political liberty through a process of largely
nondiscretionary adjudication").
124. William E. Kovacic, The Sherman Act: The First Century: Comments
and Observations, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 119, 122 (1990).
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Importantly, these considerations are not meant as an
endorsement of a history of antitrust law in which economic
ideology did not play a role in shaping antitrust adjudication; on
the contrary, it is undeniable that economics has played a central
role in the course of antitrust law since its inception."n
Consequently, the body of antitrust law exhibits a history in flux,
constantly adapting to changes in the economic context while more
or less reflecting the dominant conceptions of economic theory.2 6
However, the fact that antitrust law has maintained close ties
with prevailing economic doctrine does not mean that antitrust
law blindly follows prevailing economic doctrine.'2 ' Even in the
wake of revisions made to antitrust jurisprudence that may be
linked to the rise of the Chicago School model of antitrust analysis
in the 1970s and 1980s, the Court has not eliminated noneconomic concerns from its antitrust analysis."n Accordingly, it
might be said that the judiciary maintains a certain degree of
independence from economic theory in the formulation of antitrust
law, employing prevailing economic theory as a tool in the decision

125. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of
Competition, 74 IOWA L. REv. 1019, 1065 (1989) (stressing the historically
close relationship between the antitrust laws and economic polcymaking).
126. See Foer & Lande, supra note 89, at 16-18 (citing MARC ALLEN EISNER,
Regulatory Politics in Transition (1993)) (identifying four distinct "regimes" of
antitrust jurisprudence that have emerged since the inception of antitrust law
in response to changes in the economy and within economic theory and
asserting that modern antitrust jurisprudence has entered into a fifth regime
as a consequence, in part, of the decline in prominence of the Chicago School).
127. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 59 (noting that antitrust
policymakers do not merely toe the economic theory line, Hovenkamp states
that policy makers have also "sometimes applied economics ineptly, sometimes
gravitat[ing to] the fringes of economic theory rather than the center, and
sometimes push[ing] good points too far").
128. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451,
486 (1992) (reversing summary judgment for Kodak on a claim alleging that
the firm had violated section one of the Sherman Act through an unlawful
tying arrangement by refusing to sell replacement parts for photocopiers
except in connection with in-house repair services even though, as pointed out
by the Dissent, Kodak lacked substantial market power, a modern
requirement of tie-in law); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,
472 U.S. 585 (1985) (refusing to recognize an unqualified right to refuse to
deal with a competitor and affirming a finding of a violation of section two of
the Sherman Act where the dominant firm refused to continue to participate
in a joint venture preferred by consumers); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (affirming a finding of a violation of section one of
the Sherman Act by a manufacturer based on sufficient evidence of a "common
scheme" to set resale prices even though the evidence was consistent with
independent pricing behavior). For a discussion of the apparent economic
incongruity of these cases see HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 293-95, 397-99,
460-65.
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making process rather than as a formula for making a decision."n
The end result, however, is a body of law
often as ambiguous as
130
the statutory law it is meant to interpret.
III. THE DARK SIDE OF THE ROLLBACK SMILEY' 3 1

A. The Cost-Benefit Paradox:A Society at War with Itself
Consider Pulp Fiction, Quentin Tarantino's tale of the
interwoven lives of two mob hit men, a boxer, a gangster's wife,
and a pair of diner bandits, delivered in four tales of violence, drug
abuse, sexual deviance, and redemption.'32 At BestBuy.com, Pulp
Fiction may be purchased for $14.99;lu at Target.com it may be
purchased for $14.99 as well;"M but, at Walmart.com, the savvy
consumer may acquire the Tarantino classic for the low-low price
of $14.88.135
This $0.11 savings that Wal-Mart, Inc. brings
consumers on the purchase of Pulp Fiction, though small, is a
prime example of the firm's zealous commitment to everyday low
prices. 30 However, this simple example begs the question: how is
129. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 68 ('The public purpose of economics
is not to eliminate political concerns from policy making,[but] [riather, it is to
enable policy makers to make judgments about the costs or effectiveness of a
particular policy.").
130. Indeed, the governing 'rule of reason" standard adopted by the Court in
the StandardOil and American Tobacco cases of 1911, and applied thereafter
so that only unreasonable restraints of trade would constitute a violation of
sections one and two of the Sherman Act, was itself criticized for "render[ing]
the Sherman Act too vague and general" and making it difficult to predict the
legality of a proposed action. KINTNER, supra note 85, at 12 (1973); see also
Standard Oil, Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1911) (establishing the
rule of reason as the applicable standard for determining whether a violation
of sections one or two of the Sherman Act has occurred); American Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. at 178-80 (re-affirming the application of the rule of reason to
sections one and two of the Sherman Act).
131. For those unfamiliar with the 'Rollback Smiley," the mascot of WalMart, Inc. is a cheerful character bearing a remarkable resemblance to PacMan who can be seen rolling back prices throughout the aisles of Wal-Mart,
Inc. Discount Stores and Supercenters across the nation. The Rollback Smiley
has even been known to dress up in a Zorro costume while performing its daily
task of slashing prices for the benefit of the everyday Wal-Mart, Inc. shopper.
132. PuLP FICTION (Buena Vista Home Entertainment 2002).
133. BestBuy.com, Pulp Fiction, http://www.bestbuy.com/site/olspage.jsp?
skuld=4714189&type=product&id=54497 (last visited Dec. 28, 2006).
134. Target.com, Pulp Fiction, http://www.target.com/gp/detail.html/sr=8-7/
qid-- 130792852/ref=sr_8_7/601-0924831-8455313?%5Fencoding=UTF8&asin=
B000068DBC (last visited Dec. 28, 2006).
135. WalMart.com, Pulp Fiction, http://www.walmart.com/catalog/product.
do?productid=1875179 (last visited Dec. 28, 2006).
136. Wal-Mart, Inc.'s commitment to everyday low prices can be seen across
the entire spectrum of goods available within the confines of the Wal-Mart,
Inc. universe; in fact, the average Wal-Mart Supercenter offers prices fourteen
percent below those of competitors. Bianco & Zellner, supra note 8.
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Wal-Mart, Inc. able to pass on the $0.11 savings to consumers on
the cost of a mass market DVD sold at other major retailers who
are in direct competition with Wal-Mart, Inc.? The most obvious
answer might be that Wal-Mart, Inc. has simply mastered the
economics of productive efficiency.137 While this answer seems
obvious, even logical, it misses the mark, utterly failing to present
a complete picture of the many negative externalities flowing from
Wal-Mart, Inc.'s presence in the retail and grocery markets.
1. Positive and Negative Externalities
In economic terms, an externality is, at its most basic level,
an anti-condition that inevitably flows from the existence of a
condition." For example, the presence of Wal-Mart, Inc. in the
retail market, in combination with its commitment to everyday
low prices, places pressure on other retailers to cut prices in order
to compete, or rather, in order to survive.'39 Consumers, as a
consequence, obtain savings not only from Wal-Mart, Inc.'s
everyday low prices, but also from lower prices from Wal-Mart,
Inc.'s competitors, prices that would not exist but for Wal-Mart,
Inc.'s presence in the retail market. The savings consumers obtain
from the lower prices Wal-Mart, Inc. engenders in competitors is
an externality; more precisely, a positive externality - a benefit. 4 '
Since the benefit of lower competitor prices naturally redounds to
all consumers, and since all members of society are consumers,
this positive externality may logically be termed a social benefit.
Combine this with the low prices Wal-Mart, Inc. provides within
the confines of its own stores, and the benefit of low prices passed
on to consumers is twofold, adding up to incredible savings for the
141
consumer.
137. Indeed, there can be no doubt that Wal-Mart, Inc. is well adept at
increasing productive efficiency, squeezing billions of dollars in cost
efficiencies out of its retail supply chain over the years, and passing the
resultant savings onto its customers in the form of low prices. Id.; see also
supra Part I.B.
138. Benedict Sheehy, Corporations and Social Costs: The Wal-Mart Case
Study, 24 J.L. & COM. 1, 17 (2004). Externalities are derived from the logical

concept that "the existence of a thing precludes the non-existence of that same
thing," a mutually exclusive relationship out of which externalities are

created. Id.
139. See DICKER, supra note 2, at 173 (reporting that the entrance of WalMart, Inc. into a new community reduces competitor prices on everyday items
by five to ten percent); Lohr, supra note 7 (observing that grocery prices
decrease by ten to fifteen percent upon the entrance of Wal-Mart, Inc. into a
new community).
140. Sheehy, supra note 138, at 17-18.
141. Indeed, it is estimated that Wal-Mart, Inc. alone saved consumers $20
billion in 2002 - factor in price cuts competitors must make in order to

survive, and the total savings in 2002 approach $100 billion.
Zellner, supra note 8.

Bianco &
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The natural compliment of a positive externality is, of course,
a negative externality - a cost.142 As a corollary to the positive
externality of lower competitor prices, Wal-Mart, Inc. creates a
flood of negative externalities that echo throughout society.
Returning to a generalized version of the question presented
earlier - how is Wal-Mart, Inc. able to undercut the prices of
competitors in direct competition with the firm - a more complete
picture of Wal-Mart, Inc.'s version of "mastering the economics of
productive efficiency" may now be presented.
2. Negative Externalitiesand the Supplier Pinch
As a retailer/grocer, Wal-Mart, Inc. operates in both
downstream markets, interacting with consumers, and upstream
markets, interacting with suppliers. In order to pass savings on to
downstream consumers, Wal-Mart, Inc. actively seeks to reduce its
upstream costs by demanding lower prices from suppliers and
placing enormous pressure on them to drive product costs down.143
In reality, Wal-Mart, Inc.'s market power erases any bargaining
power suppliers might have when dealing with other buyers.'
This point cannot be overstated: Wal-Mart, Inc. does not merely
demand efficiency from suppliers,145 Wal-Mart, Inc. dictates
efficiency, exerting intractable influence over supplier operations,
from delivery schedules and inventory levels to product

142. Sheehy, supra note 138, at 17.
143. See DICKER, supra note 2, at 27 (reporting that Wal-Mart, Inc. places
burdensome demands on suppliers, requiring annual "points of improvement"
ranging from adding cost efficiencies to making the supply line more efficient
to more consistent clothing sizes); Charles Fishman, The Wal-Mart You Don't
Know,
FAST
COMPANY,
Dec.
2003,
at
68,
available
at
http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/77/walmart.html (reporting that WalMart, Inc. will insist that suppliers annually reduce the price of products that
are the same from year to year under threat of seeking alternative, lower
priced versions from competing suppliers); Bianco & Zellner, supra note 8
(reporting that Wal-Mart, Inc. is all about driving the price of a product down).
But cf. Lohr, supra note 7 (pointing out that many analysts feel Wal-Mart, Inc.
is merely leading the way in a drive to make suppliers more efficient).
144. Quite pointedly, "the only thing worse than doing business with WalMart [is] not doing business with Wal-Mart" - no laughing matter when 7.5
cents out of every dollar spent in stores across the United States go into WalMart, Inc. registers, thus making a contract with the firm critical for even the
largest suppliers. Fishman, supra note 143.
145. To be fair, there can be no doubt that Wal-Mart, Inc. does engender
efficiency within the operations of its suppliers. However, as one commentator
relates, "the ability to operate at peak efficiency only gets you in the door at
Wal-Mart. Then the real demands start[, and] there is nothing genial about
the process by which Wal-Mart gets its suppliers to provide [goods] at every
day low prices." Though Wal-Mart may be legendary for forcing its suppliers
to become more efficient, "[it is also legendary for quite straightforwardly
telling them what it will pay for their goods." Id.
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specifications and profit margins.'46 The supplier is faced with a
simple choice: conduct business on Wal-Mart, Inc. terms, or risk
the consequences of not doing business with the largest company
in the world. 4 7 Inevitably, suppliers are forced into a zero-sum
game - although, that is really only the best case scenario.
The externalities flowing from Wal-Mart, Inc.'s presence in
the upstream market toll an insufferable price on society in the
form of social costs. Suppliers who have little choice but to bow to
the "Always Low Prices. Always." diktat of Wal-Mart, Inc. must
make serious changes to their business operations in order to
remain in the black. This is not to say that suppliers do not have
options. Indeed, there are several, but none reverberate to the
benefit of the consumer.
One option is for a supplier to cannibalize itself.'"
Cannibalization will occur when a supplier undercuts its own
products in other markets,149 or simply gives up other markets in
order to meet Wal-Mart, Inc. demands - in both scenarios the
sacrificed market is generally more profitable. 50 During the 1980s,
Huffy Bicycle Co., a division of Huffy Corp., chose the latter
method of cannibalization. 5' Having made a commitment to
supply Wal-Mart, Inc. with as many low-end, low-margin bikes as
Wal-Mart, Inc. needed, the President woke up one morning to an
order for 900,000 bikes, twice the production output his factories
146. See Bianco & Zellner, supra note 8 (reporting that Wal-Mart, Inc.
controls delivery schedules, inventory levels, and aggressively influences
product specifications); Fishman, supra note 143 (maintaining that it is not
unusual for Wal-Mart, Inc. to demand to scrutinize a supplier's private
records, and to insist that high margins must be cut).
147. See Bianco & Zellner, supra note 8 ("[11n the end, many suppliers have
to choose between designing goods their way or the Wal-Mart way."); Fishman,
supra note 143 (suggesting that "supplying Wal-Mart is like getting into the
company version of basic training with an implacable Army drill sergeant").
148. Sheehy, supra note 138, at 36.
149. The marriage of Levi Strauss to Wal-Mart, Inc. paved the way for a
textbook illustration of this form of business cannibalization scenario. In
2003, Levi-Strauss ended a 150 year streak of survival without Wal-Mart, Inc.,
entering into an agreement to stock the firm's shelves with its iconic brand
name jeans. Fishman, supra note 143. Unfortunately, Levi-Strauss did not
actually have any clothes cheap enough to sell at Wal-Mart, Inc. Id. LeviStrauss was forced to expand its operation to include a low-end "Levi-Strauss
Signature" brand, which has since flown off Wal-Mart, Inc. shelves. Id.
However, it is likely that any success Levi-Strauss realizes from its Signature
brand will be offset by decreased sales of its premium brands, thus effectively
cannibalizing its own sales. Id. Moreover, the shift in operations sacrifices
quality for price, leaving consumers with cheap goods produced by outsourced
labor. Id.
150. See Sheehy, supra note 138, at 36 (asserting that cannibalization of a
suppliers' own products in other markets often entails the cannibalization of
much more profitable markets); see also infra notes 151-155 and associated
text.
151. Fishman, supra note 143.
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could handle.'
Rather than renegotiate, as might have been
possible with other retailers, the President shifted operations,
handing over designs for four of the companies higher-end, highermargin bikes to competitors and freeing up resources to meet WalMart, Inc.'s demands.'53 Cannibalization, however, is a zero-sum
game, and ultimately Huffy lost by moving out of more profitable
markets and exclusively into the everyday low prices market.
The consequence of such cannibalization is that suppliers are left
to cautiously balance the line between black and red as profit
margins dip dramatically, 5 while consumers are left to witness
the sacrifice of product quality and consumer choice at the altar of
everyday low prices."
A second option available to suppliers looking to stay in the
black is simply to cut labor costs.'57 In order to meet the demands
dispensed by the everyday low prices market, manufacturers are
often forced either to lay off employees or merely export operations
to the low-cost labor centers in China and beyond.'
The appeal of
this option is its versatility; even cannibals like Huffy Bicycle Co.,
which has not manufactured a bike in the United States since
1999, can employ it. 59 While Wal-Mart, Inc. is certainly not the
only driving force behind the outsourcing of American jobs, there
can be no question that Wal-Mart, Inc., accounting for nearly ten
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id. (underscoring the zero-sum nature of cannibalization is the fact
that even though Huffy was the number three seller of bikes in the United
States in 2003, during three of the five preceding years Huffy Corp. was
unable to make a profit); see also Sheehy, supra note 138, at 36 (confirming
that Wal-Mart, Inc. induced cannibalization is zero-sum: the shift in
operations from a profitable market to the Wal-Mart, Inc. market has no net
gain to the supplier).
155. See Sheehy, supra note 138, at 36 (pointing out the advantages and
disadvantages of having Wal-Mart, Inc. as a customer: on the one hand, the
supplier's sales will increase dramatically; on the other hand, the supplier's
profit margins dip dramatically, placing ever increasing pressure on the
business).
156. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to Buyers'
Competitive Conduct, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1121, 1123 (2005) (commenting that
drastic dips in profitability may force suppliers to reduce their output of goods
and services, harming consumers in the end).
157. See DICKER, supra note 2, at 27 (relating that the Wal-Mart, Inc.'s
demands for low prices make it difficult for suppliers to offer livable wages and
good working conditions to their employees); Piraino, supra note 156, at 1123
(remarking that suppliers are often forced to either outsource operations or
limit domestic operation in order to survive the demands of Wal-Mart, Inc.).
158. Lohr, supra note 7; Fishman, supra note 143.
159. Fishman, supra note 143. Levi-Strauss has also taken advantage of the
versatility of the labor cutting option, closing the last of its sixty domestic
plants in 2004 in favor of cheap off shore labor and thus combining
outsourcing with cannibalization in a move to cut costs for the everyday low
prices market. Id.; see also supra note 149.
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percent of all Chinese exports to the United States, is helping
accelerate the process. 6 ' Outsourcing negatively impacts everyone
by placing a greater burden on the government to provide support
for the unemployed, a burden that is inevitably shouldered by
all."6 Being that everyone is a consumer, 6' all consumers must
absorb the impact of this negative externality. Moreover, the
obvious effect felt by the consumer whose job has been outsourced
illustrates the impact most pointedly: you can't buy low-priced
goods from Wal-Mart, Inc. if you don't have a job. 6
The last option available to the supplier is simply to refuse to
elect any of the preceding options. Regrettably, when dealing with
Wal-Mart, Inc., failure to elect one of these options is not an
option. While it may not be the black letter policy of Wal-Mart,
Inc. to force suppliers to cut costs through cannibalization, lay offs,
or outsourcing,'6 the reality is that such a policy is not necessary.
As the President of Huffy Bicycle Co. recounts regarding his
decision to abandon the company's high-end production, "WalMart didn't tell me what to do .... They didn't have to." 65 WalMart, Inc. knows that if one supplier cannot deliver everyday low
prices, there is another supplier waiting on deck that will, and
Wal-Mart, Inc. will not hesitate to remind recalcitrant suppliers of
160. Fishman, supra note 143; see also Bianco & Zellner, supra note 8
(suggesting that the zealous pursuit of everyday low prices is at least partly to
blame for the acceleration of outsourcing to China and other low-cost labor
centers throughout the world).
161. See William P. Quigley, The Right to Work and Earn a Living Wage: A
Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 2 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 139, 165-66
(asserting that the costs of unemployment felt by society as a whole exceed
those felt by the unemployed individuals themselves) (citing PHILIP HARVEY,
SECURING THE RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND THE
UNEMPLOYED IN THE UNITED STATES, 51-53 (1989)); Erika Kinetz, Who Wins

and Who Loses as Jobs Move Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003 Late Edition
Final, at 5 (reporting the observations of prominent economists
substantiating the existence of broad negative effects of outsourcing that reach
beyond the individual whose job is outsourced); see also Sheehy, supra note
138, at 40 (claiming that unemployment results in a loss of security and
stability, costs that are ultimately born by the friends and family of the
unemployed, as well as the state).
162. See supra note 92.
163. Indeed, in July 2003, some 5,000 workers employed in the Pillowtex
textile factory lost their jobs as a consequence of pressures placed on the
Dallas-based company to cut labor costs. In 2004, more than a third of the
laid-off workers were still unemployed, and thus unable to take advantage of
the low prices offered by Wal-Mart, Inc. DICKER, supra note 2, at 114-15.
164. See Ann Zimmerman, Defending Wal-Mart, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2004, at
B1 (quoting Wal-Mart, Inc. CEO Lee Scott regarding the perception that WalMart, Inc. is partly responsible for the outsourcing of American jobs, Scott was
"not familiar with the idea that Wal-Mart brings anyone in and says you need
to take this item offshore. I can't say it never happened, but I can say that is
not our policy").
165. Fishman, supra note 143, at 68.
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this reality." In a world in which doing business with Wal-Mart,
Inc. is a forgone conclusion, suppliers banned from the temple of
everyday low prices are effectively given the kiss of death - left
only with the hope that their plot in the graveyard of Wal-Mart,
Inc. victims has a nice view."' Thus, suppliers have only two
options: cut costs using one of the aforementioned methods, or
walk into the light and hope a friend will be kind enough to place
roses at their tombstone now and again. Either way, consumers
lose.
3. Negative Externalitiesand the Consumer Pinch
Suppliers may find solace in the fact that they are not the sole
victims of the Wal-Mart, Inc. machine. Indeed, the negative
externalities flowing from Wal-Mart, Inc.'s presence in the retail
and grocery markets come in a variety of forms. The most
conspicuous manifests itself everywhere Wal-Mart, Inc. opens its
doors, for whenever Wal-Mart, Inc. opens its doors, inevitably,
doors close elsewhere." As a corollary of the everyday low prices
mentality, Wal-Mart, Inc. effectively saturates every community it
enters with low prices, putting small, locally-owned stores that
cannot compete out of business.'69 Moreover, no longer is it merely
the small, locally-owned stores drowning in the wake of Wal-Mart,
Inc., both Kmart and FAO Schwartz have been forced to seek

166. See id. (illustrating this concept and its impact on the Vlasic pickle
company). Vlasic experienced the broadside of this reality in relation to its
supply of pickles to Wal-Mart, Inc. For years, Vlasic supplied Wal-Mart, Inc.
with a gallon jar of pickles sold by Wal-Mart, Inc. for the extremely low price
of $2.97. Id. The gallon jar was a "devastating success," selling at eighty jars
a week on average in every store, accounting for thirty percent of Vlasic's
business. Id. Unfortunately, as Vlasic's profit margins dipped, so did their
profits, plummeting some twenty-five percent as a consequence. Id. When
Vlasic went to Wal-Mart, Inc. to beg for relief, the firm responded with a
threat to take its business elsewhere. Id. Eventually, Wal-Mart, Inc. eased off
after realizing the negative impact resonating throughout the pickle industry.
Id. Notably, however, Wal-Mart, Inc.'s change of heart apparently came too
late, as Vlasic filed for bankruptcy shortly after the pressure was released. Id.
167. See id. (relating the downfall of the Lovable company, a lingerie
manufacturer that had been in the Wal-Mart, Inc. business since the
beginning). Nonetheless, when Lovable could not meet the demands of the
everyday low prices market, Wal-Mart, Inc. pulled its business. Id. Three
years later, Lovable closed. Id.; see also Pinairo, supra note 156, at 1123
(confirming that many Wal-Mart, Inc. suppliers unable to make a reasonable
profit under the regime of everyday low prices are often forced out of
business).
168. See DICKER, supra note 2, at 60 (reporting that, for every Supercenter
that opens, two grocery stores close); WAL-MART: THE HIGH COST OF LOW

PRICE (Bravenew Films 2005) (detailing the negative consequences of WalMart, Inc.'s descent upon several cities in rural America; namely, the closure
of independent local stores).
169. Piraino, supra note 156, at 1124.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[40:267

refuge in Chapter 11,17 while Toys R Us has been forced to take a
chapter out of the supplier survival book, cannibalizing itself by
shifting operations to its Babies R Us division.'71 The result is that
consumers are left with fewer retail and grocery alternatives other
than Wal-Mart, Inc., while detrimental community effects,
including unemployment, decreased consumer choice, and reduced
small business, intensify
without end, unavoidably harming the
172
consumer citizen.
It is quite natural to expect aftershocks to resonate from the
epicenter of an earthquake for some time after the initial tremor.
With Wal-Mart, Inc., the aftershocks felt by a community after the
initial effects run their course are unending, and potentially of
much greater intensity. It is no secret that Wal-Mart, Inc. opposes
labor unions with a ferocity that is reminiscent of the late 19th
century when the Sherman Antitrust Act itself was used to break
up unions. 173 Indeed, a Waltonism treasured by management
proclaims that Wal-Mart, Inc. is not anti-union, Wal-Mart, Inc. is

170. See Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart Triggers Tumult in Toyland:
Independent Stores Can't Match Chain's Buying Power, WASH. POST, May 31,
2004, at E01 (reporting that fierce competition with Wal-Mart, Inc. was the
chief reason FAO Schwartz filed bankruptcy in 2004); Leslie Earnest & Greg
Johnson, K-Mart Seeks Bankruptcy Protection, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, at
Bus. 1 (detailing Kmart's path to bankruptcy and noting that its decline
stemmed largely from fierce competition with Wal-Mart, Inc., as well as
Target Corp.); see also Susan Chandler, Will Bigger be Better?; Retail Experts
Not Sold on Wisdom of Combining 2 'Broken' Companies, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 18,
2004, at C1 (discussing the background and possible reasoning underlying the
merger between Kmart and Sears).
171. See Michael Barbaro, Toys R Us Restructuring; After Losing Market
Share, Company May Sell Divisions, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2004, at E01
(reporting an announcement made by Toys R Us regarding its plan to separate
its Toys R Us division from its Babies R Us division in 2005, a move the
company felt was necessary in the face of fierce competition by discounters led
by Wal-Mart, Inc.).
172. See Sheehy, supra note 138, at 36 (suggesting that when Wal-Mart, Inc.
establishes a new store in a community, several detrimental effects can be
expected to follow, including: "decreased community involvement, decreased
community building efforts, decreased small business, decreased labor
opportunities, and increased commercial vacancies").
173. See Randolph T. Holhut, The Wal-Martization of the American
Economy, AM. REP., Sept. 2004, at 10 (proclaiming that Wal-Mart, Inc. "has
perhaps the most aggressive union-busting operation of any major U.S.
corporation...."); WAL-MART: THE HIGH COST OF Low PRICE, supra note 168
(describing Wal-Mart, Inc.'s plan of attack in the face of an organization drive,
which includes the operation of a 24-hour hotline, the dispatching of a rapid
response team to supervise store activity during organization drives, an antiunion camera package for tracking union activities, the use of an undercover
spy-cam, as well as the showing of vehemently anti-union videos); see also
DICKER, supra note 2, at 93-97 (discussing Wal-Mart, Inc.'s unwavering
commitment to its union-prevention program, often blurring the line between
legal and illegal anti-union activities).

2006]

Always Low Prices,Always at a Cost

pro-associate."' While such a truism is dripping with a sense of
pride and respect for Wal-Mart, Inc. "associates," 7' it does not
accord with the high associate turnover rate requiring Wal-Mart,
Inc. to replace nearly half of its beloved associates on an annual
basis. 7 ' Nor does it accord with the massive, even record breaking
class action lawsuits filed for associate mistreatment.'
In reality,
upon a second look, Wal-Mart, Inc.'s "pro-associate policy" is
anything but, and that is without considering the pervasive use of
overseas sweatshops in China and India. 7 '
In addition, the oft-repeated "Wal-Mart provides good jobs"
mantra 179 is in disharmony with the reality that Wal-Mart, Inc.'s
"good jobs" are subsidized by the consumer, but not through the
purchase of Wal-Mart, Inc.'s low priced goods. In 2001, the

174. See Cora Daniels, Up Against the Wal-Mart; Think Your Job is Tough?
Meet the People Whose Task it is to Unionize the World's Biggest Company,
FORTUNE, May 17, 2004, at 112 (noting that Wal-Mart, Inc. maintains a policy
toward unionization of being "pro-associate, not anti-union"); Steven
Greenhouse, Trying to Overcome Embarrassment, Labor Opens a Drive to
Organize Wal-Mart, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2002, at 28 (noting that Wal-Mart,
Inc. adopts a persona of being pro-associate rather than presenting a negative
attitude towards unionization).
175. See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 174, at 112 (noting that, in company
parlance, Wal-Mart, Inc. workers are referred to as associates, rather than
employees).
176. See DICKER, supra note 2, at 30 (placing the Wal-Mart, Inc. associate
turnover rate at forty-four percent for 2003, down from fifty-six percent just
two years earlier).
177. See Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Nos. 3217, 3757, 2005 Phila. Ct.
Com. P1. LEXIS 551, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1., Dec. 27, 2005) (certifying a class
action involving potentially 150,000 current and former Wal-Mart, Inc.
associates claiming damages from missed breaks and 'off the clock" work);
Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (certifying a class action
on behalf of over one million current and former female associates claiming
unequal wage and promotion policies); DICKER, supra note 2, at 106 (citing
Dukes v. Wal-Mart as "the largest class-action lawsuit in American history");
see also WAL-MART: THE HIGH COST OF LOW PRICE, supra note 168 (reporting
that Wal-Mart, Inc. was facing lawsuits in thirty-one states in 2000 regarding
wage and hour abuses).
178. See DICKER, supra note 2, at 107-12, 118-20 (recounting the scandalous
history surrounding Wal-Mart, Inc.'s association with sweatshop operations
oversees and describing Wal-Mart, Inc.'s endeavors to avoid disclosure
concerning employment conditions in oversees factories); WAL-MART: THE
HIGH COST OF Low PRICE, supra note 168 (detailing Wal-Mart, Inc.'s violation
of labor standards and the policy of informing Chinese factories in advance of
pending labor inspections, and coaching employees on how to respond to
inspectors regarding work conditions).
179. See DICKER, supra note 2, at 29 (describing Wal-Mart, Inc.'s
unwavering response when confronted with negative information regarding
employment practices: "Wal-Mart provides good jobs"); see also WAL-MART
2004, supra note 4, at 1, 4-7 (relating the stories of a diverse group of WalMart, Inc. associates who have benefited from the "good jobs and good careers"
Wal-Mart, Inc. provides).
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average in-store associate made roughly $8.23 an hour, or about
$13,800 a year,'80 well below equivalent employees' wages
elsewhere. 8' After six months of working full-time at this wage, a
Wal-Mart, Inc. associate is eligible for health insurance, that is, if
the associate can afford it."11 According to a report from the House
of Representatives' Committee on Education and the Workforce, a
single Wal-Mart, Inc. associate "could end up spending around
$6,400 out-of-pocket - about 45% of her annual full-time salary Not
before seeing a single benefit from the health plan.""
surprisingly, many Wal-Mart, Inc. associates turn away from the
exorbitantly high Wal-Mart, Inc. healthcare plan and seek aid
from none other than the consumers they are employed to serve,
signing up en masse for state and national public welfare
programs."8 Indeed, the annual cost to consumer taxpayers is an
estimated $1.5 billion dollars to support Wal-Mart, Inc.'s
underpaid employees.'85 Consequently, less funding is available
for other public services and programs.
Wal-Mart, Inc.'s exploitation of the consumer taxpayer does
not end with support for its own associates. The power Wal-Mart,
Inc. wields is not limited to the private domain. In fact, Wal-Mart,
Inc. extracts large subsidies from federal and state governments
seeking to induce Wal-Mart, Inc. to open its doors in a particular
locality and dreaming of future revenue or an answer to urban

180. REP. GEORGE MILLER, DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF THE COMM. ON EDUC.
AND THE WORKFORCE, 135TH CONG., EVERYDAY Low WAGES: THE HIDDEN
PRICE WE ALL PAY FOR WAL-MART 4 (2004) [hereinafter EVERYDAY LOW
WAGES].

181. Id. at 4 (contrasting the average Wal-Mart, Inc. sales clerk wage of
$8.23 an hour with the average supermarket employee wage of $10.35 an
hour).
182. Notably, in order to qualify as a full-time associate, the associate must
work thirty-four hours a week, up from the former threshold of twenty-eight
hours a week that had placed approximately one-third of Wal-Mart, Inc.
associates in the part-time category. DICKER, supra note 2, at 83. Moreover, a
part-time associate must put in two years as a Wal-Mart, Inc. associate before
earning eligibility for health insurance. Id.
183. EVERYDAY Low WAGES, supra note 180, at 7.
184. See WAL-MART: THE HIGH COST OF LOW PRICE, supra note 168 (listing
the number of Wal-Mart, Inc. associates and dependents enrolled in public
welfare programs in several states: 3864 children of Wal-Mart, Inc. associates
in Alabama; 3971 Wal-Mart, Inc. associates in Arkansas; 2700 Wal-Mart, Inc.
associates in Arizona; 824 Wal-Mart, Inc. associates in Connecticut with
children enrolled; 12,300 Wal-Mart, Inc. associates and dependents in Florida;
10,261 children of Wal-Mart, Inc. associates in Georgia; 4172 Wal-Mart, Inc.
associates and dependents in Massachusetts; 9617 Wal-Mart, Inc. associates
in Tennessee; 4363 children of Wal-Mart, Inc. associates in Texas; 1252 WalMart, Inc. associates and dependents in Wisconsin).
185. Id.
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blight." Over the years, it is estimated that Wal-Mart, Inc. has
extracted subsidies amounting to at least $1.008 billion in the
form of free or reduced-price land, tax breaks, rebates and credits,
infrastructure assistance, special zoning status, general grants,
and job training and worker recruitment funds.'87
In fact,
according to a Wal-Mart, Inc. official, the firm seeks subsidies for
nearly one-third of its retail projects."
The consequence is
obvious, communities suffer because fewer resources are available
for necessary public services such as police and fire personnel, as
well as education.'89 The real slap in the consumer's face, however,
does not come until Wal-Mart, Inc. abandons the subsidized
building, leaving behind a building too large for any other firm to
realistically occupy."
As if it was not enough that consumer citizens pay for the low
priced Wal-Mart, Inc. products twice, first at the cash register and
second at the tax register, Wal-Mart, Inc. dictates what products
consumer citizens may purchase at those registers.' Absent from
the aisles of Wal-Mart stores are any music CD's with parental

186. PHILLIP MATTERA & ANNA PURINTON, GOOD JOBS FIRST, SHOPPING FOR
SUBSIDIES: How WAL-MART USES TAXPAYER MONEY TO FINANCE ITS NEVER-

ENDING GROWTH 7, 8 (2004), available at http'//www.goodjobsfirst.orgpdf/
wmtstudt.pdf; see also DICKER, supra note 2, at 27 (charging conservatives
with advancing the argument that the construction of Wal-Mart, Inc. stores in
low income areas is a solution to urban blight); WAL-MART: THE HIGH COST OF
Low PRICE, supra note 168 (comparing the disparate treatment independently
owned retail stores receive from the government, as exemplified by the Esry's
IGA store formerly operated by Red Esry in Hamilton, Missouri, compared to
the unending stream of subsidies Wal-Mart, Inc. receives).
187. MATTERA & PURINTON, supra note 186, at 7-9.
188. B. John Bisio, Platteville Provided Wal-Mart Assistance, TELEGRAPH
HERALD (Dubuque, IA), Mar. 30, 2001, at a4.
189. See WAL-MART: THE HIGH COST OF Low PRICE,

supra note

168

(charging Wal-Mart, Inc. with responsibility for the shortage of police and fire
personnel in Cathedral City, California as a consequence of failing to follow
through with tax commitments made after the city invested $1.8 million in the
company); id. (noting that the $1.7 million subsidy Wal-Mart, Inc. received in
2005 from Denver, Co. was enough to keep open three schools closed during
the Spring of that year).
190. See id. (documenting the existence of 26,699,678 sq. ft. of empty WalMart stores nationwide (approximately 260 vacant Wal-Mart Supercenters), or
enough space to build 29,666 classrooms and educate 593,326 kids).
Cathedral City, CA. provides a stinging example of the "business purposes"
that might underlie a Wal-Mart, Inc. decision to abandon a subsidized Wal-

Mart Supercenter and Sam's Club merely to open new stores two miles from
the now vacant buildings, just outside of the city limits and just as the city
was to begin receiving %100 of the sales tax profits according to the original
subsidy deal. Id.
191. See DICKER, supra note 2, at 148 (advancing the contention that,
"[ulnder the banner of responding to customer concerns and ensuring a familyfriendly environment, Wal-Mart has become a [powerful] cultural
gatekeeper ....
").
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advisory warnings" or anti-Wal-Mart lyrics, 93 so called "ladmagazines" Maxim, FHM, or Stuff,' pregnant Barbie dolls,'95 the
morning after pill Previn," and Jon Stewart's America: The
Book. 9 7 While it is undoubtedly the right of Wal-Mart, Inc. to sell
only what it chooses, Wal-Mart, Inc. has shirked such economically
efficient principles as supply and demand199 in favor of donning the
crown of cultural gatekeeper not merely as a legal right, but as a
means to restrict consumer choice and advance its own political
and cultural agenda."
Indeed, the arbitrary and hypocritical
manifestations of Wal-Mart, Inc.'s right to choose what it sells 0
raises the specter of the Wal-Martization of American culture - a
clockwork orange of positive reinforcement meant to solidify the
Wal-Mart, Inc. version of what is morally reprehensible and what
is not.2 '
The conclusion is inevitable: the social benefit of low prices
comes with an increasingly high price tag. Deftly hidden from the
consumer behind what is in essence a faqade of low prices, the
high price tag essential to the creation of Wal-Mart, Inc.'s
everyday low prices is billed to the consumer citizen in the form of

192. Id. at 152.
193. See id. at 155 (commenting on Wal-Mart, Inc.'s ban of a CD recorded by
Sheryl Crow based on the apparently offensive lyrics, "Watch out sister /
Watch out brother / Watch our children as they kill each other / with a gun
they bought at the Wal-Mart discount stores").
194. Id. at 148.
195. Id. at 154.
196. Id. at 148.
197. Id. at 155.
198. See id. at 154-55 (noting the popularity of such banned entertainers as
Eminem and Jon Stewart among consumers whom Wal-Mart, Inc. targets, yet
denies the ability to purchase all they seek to buy).
199. See Sheehy, supra note 138, at 42 (proclaiming that the underlying
reason for cultural restraints Wal-Mart, Inc. places on consumer choice is to
prevent opposition from the consumer citizen to the political agenda WalMart, Inc. seeks to advance); see Bianco & Zellner, supra note 8 (asserting that
Wal-Mart, Inc.'s cultural gatekeeping narrows the offerings of mainstream
entertainment and imparts a conservative tilt upon it).
200. See DICKER, supra note 2, at 156 (pondering the apparent incongruity
between saying no to stocking such products as emergency birth control, CD's
with lewd music lyrics, and lad magazines while saying yes to the products of
Paris Hilton, Michael Moore, and Quentin Tarantino). Indeed, Paris Hilton's
CONFESSIONS OF AN HEIRESS, Michael Moore's FAHRENHEIT 9/11, and Quentin
Tarantino's PULP FICTION can all be found in stock at Wal-Mart, Inc. stores
across the country. Id. at 144, 158; see also supra note 135.
201. See DICKER, supra note 2, at 155 (drawing an analogy between WalMart, Inc.'s merchandising decisions and the cruel state sponsored positive
reinforcement tactics employed in Anthony Burgess' novel A CLOCKWORK
ORANGE); see also Greenhouse, supra note 8 (quoting Nelson Lichtenstein, a
history professor at the University of California: "In short, [Wal-Mart, Inc's]
management legislates for the rest of us key components of American social
and industrial policy").

20061

Always Low Prices,Always at a Cost

negative externalities. Nevertheless, even in the face of these
teeming social costs, Wal-Mart, Inc. has become a "template
industry," setting the bar for competitors." 2 However, rather than
raising the bar, Wal-Mart, Inc. is lowering it, pulling competitors'
operating standards down to dangerously low levels.2" As retailers and grocers across the country are forced to convert to WalMartology in a bid to level the competitive playing field according
to the diktat of everyday low prices, the negative externalities
flowing from Wal-Mart, Inc.'s presence in the retail and grocery
markets will multiply exponentially. As the high cost of low prices
increases without end, the Wal-Martization of America becomes a
looming reality.
B. Wal-Mart, Inc.: "Efficient Monopolist"or
"Wolf in Sheep's Skin" - a Matter of Perspective
The final determination of whether Wal-Mart, Inc. should be
showered with praises or cut down in ignominy will depend, as
many things do, on who frames the issue. No matter who does the
framing though, one pivotal issue will conclude the success or
failure of either position. Governing the outcome is the consumer,
or rather the consumer's conduct. Every time a consumer crosses
the threshold of a Wal-Mart, Inc. store to take advantage of the
undeniably attractive low prices, the consumer registers a vote in
favor of Wal-Mart, Inc.2" Considering that consumer welfare is
the quintessential goal of both antitrust camps, who is better
suited to judge the extent of consumer welfare than the consumer?
Ultimately then, the significance of consumer reaction to WalMart, Inc.'s presence in the retail and grocery markets plays a

202. See DICKER, supra note 2, at 116 (citing University of California
professor Nelson Lichtenstein for the proposition that Wal-Mart, Inc. has
indeed become "a template industry").
203. See id. at 104-05 (describing the series of events that ensued within the
California grocery market after Wal-Mart, Inc. announced plans to open forty
Supercenters across California: wage concession demands by the grocers
Safeway, Albertsons, and Kroger; the breakdown of collective bargaining
negotiations and rejection of the grocers final offer; a strike kicked off by an
employee walkout and eventual lock-out; and, the eventual settlement on
contract terms little better than the grocers' original final offer); see id. at 89
(documenting the inducement St. Paul, Minnesota gave Target Corp. by
waiving the application of its living wage ordinance to a new downtown store
and providing Target Corp. with a $6.3 million subsidy to open the store);
WAL-MART: THE HIGH COST OF LOW PRICE, supra note 168 (reporting that
Wal-Mart, Inc. drives down retail wages a total of $3 billion every year).
204. See Hovenkamp, supra note 87, at 26 (elucidating the view that a
proper measure of consumer preference looks only at what consumers buy in
the marketplace); see Greenhouse, supra note 8 (quoting historian James
Hoopes who commented that "[pleople are voting with their feet and with their

dollars by shopping at Wal-Mart").
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definitive role in assessing Wal-Mart, Inc.'s status under the
antitrust laws.
With over 100,000,000 consumers crossing the threshold on a
weekly basis, Wal-Mart, Inc. and its apologists have an
exceptionally strong foundation on which to construct an
argument in favor of making Wal-Mart, Inc. the gold standard."5
Without a doubt, it is not a far leap to the proposition that WalMart, Inc.'s increases in productive efficiency are greater than any
decreases in allocative efficiency, resulting in a net efficiency gain
for consumer welfare and militating against antitrust law
intervention."
The proof, as they say, is in the pudding: if
consumer welfare was not benefiting from Wal-Mart, Inc.,
consumers would not be flocking to Wal-Mart, Inc. stores.
Moreover, from the perspective of the Efficiency Camp, Wal-Mart,
Inc. has increased productive efficiency not at the expense of
allocative efficiency, but in its favor by lowering prices and
bringing them closer to marginal cost. 7 Indeed, the Efficiency
Camp has already paved the way for the likes of Wal-Mart, Inc.,
carving out space within the Chicago School for the "efficient
monopolist" that passes its efficiency gains on to the consumer in
the form of lower prices.2 °"
Any opposition to Wal-Mart, Inc. that might flow from the
Protectionist Camp must contend with the apparent consumer
preference for Wal-Mart, Inc. However, to the rank and file
opposition, the combination of Wal-Mart, Inc.'s efficiency with the
consumer reaction to its presence in the retail and grocery
markets poses nothing less than a logical dilemma a
philosophical haymaker with the ability to end discussion on the
matter in two different ways, both in favor of the "efficient
monopolist." First, as the Efficiency Camp contends, if the central
concern of antitrust law is efficiency, Wal-Mart, Inc. is a template
industry and should be celebrated. Nevertheless, even if efficiency
concerns are subordinate to other non-economic values, as the
Protectionist Camp contends, Wal-Mart, Inc. remains on solid
ground.

205. See Bianco & Zellner, supra note 8 (noting that "138 million shoppers"
visit Wal-Mart stores on a weekly basis). Indeed, it was estimated that eightytwo percent of American households made at least one purchase from WalMart, Inc. in 2002. Id.
206. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
207. See Piraino, supra note 156, at 1172 (proposing that Wal-Mart, Inc.'s
success is a consequence of keeping its production costs to a minimum and
passing along the savings to the customer).
208. See Bork, supra note 91, at 26-31 (arguing that Congress intended to
exempt the efficient monopolist from the strictures of the Sherman Act to the
benefit of consumer welfare); POSNER, supra note 88, at 22 (maintaining that
the efficient monopolist would increase consumer welfare, and thus should not

only be tolerated, but encouraged).
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Recall that it is the fundamental tenet of the Protectionist
Camp that antitrust law is not concerned solely with efficiency
concerns, but rather is meant to promote other non-economic
values preferred by the consumer."
The problem with this
argument as applied to Wal-Mart, Inc. is evident immediately.
Before any negative externalities may be admitted as evidence
that non-economic values favored by consumers are being harmed
by Wal-Mart, Inc., the Protectionist Camp must establish that
non-economic consumer interests are to be given greater weight
than efficiency concerns. However, the ultimate non-economic
consumer interest, consumer preference, undeniably favors WalMart, Inc. 10 While those within the Protectionist Camp will
forcefully contend that Wal-Mart, Inc. is in essence a "wolf in
sheep's skin" - championing low prices for the benefit of the
consumer, while using them as a faqade for high consumer cost until the wolf turns on the consumer and raises prices, it is
unlikely that consumer preference will change. 1' So long as
consumer preference favors Wal-Mart, Inc., any argument that
consumers allegedly prefer non-economic values over the
proliferation of the efficient monopolist is undercut by the reality
of consumer preference. Thus, viewed from within either camp of
antitrust jurisprudence, the facts favor Wal-Mart, Inc. and modern
antitrust law is left on the sidelines as a cheerleader for the
efficient monopolist, with a consumer stamp of approval.
IV. RECONCILIATION AND RESTRAINT -

STEMMING THE TIDE OF THE
WAL-MARTIZATION OF AMERICA

While it would be inimical to assert that a statement of one
Senator on the floor of the Senate could reconcile the conflict
between the Efficiency Camp and the Protectionist Camp, the
words of Senator John Sherman considered independent from the
two camps might provide some insight on how Wal-Mart, Inc.
should fare under the antitrust act bearing his name:
The popular mind is agitated with problems that might disturb
social order, and among them none is more threatening than the
inequality of condition of wealth, and opportunity that has grown
within a single generation out of the concentration of capital into
vast combinations to control production and trade and to break
down competition.

212

209. See supra notes 113-119 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
211. See Greenhouse, supra note 8 (quoting historian James Hoopes who
observes that "[i]f anybody is proposing that they're going to solve what they
see as the Wal-Mart problem by urging people not to think of themselves as
consumers, they're barking up the wrong tree").
212. 21 CONG. REC. 2598 (1890); accord id. at 2460 (endorsing Senator
Sherman's concern, Senator George mused: "Is production, is trade, to be
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In 1890, the concentration of power that Sherman and his
colleagues feared was manifest in industries dominated by the
likes of the sugar, lead, and oil trusts.2 3 There was a concern that
such divisive concentration would spread, manifesting itself
elsewhere as the trust mentality infected others.2 4 History has
proven the concern acute. The emergence of A&P as the dominant
force in the grocery market in the 1930s exemplifies the ability of
the contagion to spread."
Wal-Mart, Inc. exemplifies its
mutation.
Contrasted with the trusts and monopolies of the past, WalMart, Inc. is undeniably its own breed of behemoth. Indeed,
rather than achieve dominance in a single market, Wal-Mart, Inc.
has effectively achieved dominance in the dual retail and grocery
markets.2"6 Wal-Mart, Inc., though, has achieved dominance not
by utilizing the historical method of illegal combination, but
through unrivaled internal efficiency. 1 7 Moreover, Wal-Mart,
Inc.'s combination of efficient domination with a concurrent
devotion to low prices has produced undeniable social benefits, a
catalyst for further Wal-Martization.2 8 Consequently, antitrust
scholars have been hard pressed to accuse Wal-Mart, Inc. of

taken away from the great mass of the people concentrated in the hands of a
few men who, I am obliged to add, by the policies pursued by our Government,
have been enabled to aggregate to themselves large, enormous fortunes?").
Senator Hoar confirmed this sentiment:
The complaint which has come from all parts and all classes of the
country of these great monopolies, which are becoming not only in some
cases an actual injury to the comfort of ordinary life, but are a menace to
republican institutions themselves, has induced Congress to take the
matter up.
Id. at 3146
213. See 21 CONG. REC. 4101 (1890) (naming the trusts controlling the sugar,
oil, and lead markets as examples of the harmful consequences of market
concentration); KINTNER, supra note 85, at 8 (affirming the identification of
the oil, sugar, and lead trusts as examples of the "great trusts" in existence by
1887).
214. See 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890) (demonstrating the immediacy of the
danger presented by the trusts, Senator Sherman declared: "Congress alone
can deal with them, and if we are unwilling or unable there will soon be a
trust for every production and a master to fix the price for every necessity of
life"); Foer & Lande, supra note 89, at 18 (arguing that the impetus for the
Sherman Antitrust Act was a society concerned about the spreading of "trusts"
throughout important industries).
215. See generally TEDLOW, supra note 10, at 189-214 (detailing the rise to
dominance of A&P in the grocery market during the early 20th century).
216. In fact, Wal-Mart, Inc. prefers not to place any restrictions on the scope
of its dominance, expanding into every conceivable market amenable to a WalMart, Inc. makeover. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
217. See supra Part I.B.
218. See supra Part I.C.
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violating the Sherman Act." 9 However, to conclude that the
subsistence of low prices alone determines the innocence of WalMart, Inc. permits those low prices to act as a smoke screen for the
considerable social costs flowing from the operation of Wal-Mart,
Inc.22 Even further, this conclusion flatly ignores concerns that
"
drove the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act.22
'
A proper judgment of Wal-Mart, Inc.'s status under the
Sherman Antitrust Act would be reached by balancing the social
benefits of low prices against the illimitable social costs flowing
from Wal-Mart, Inc.'s presence in the retail and grocery markets.
The scales of such a balance seem poised to do nothing but give in
to the heavy burden imposed by the social costs emanating from
Wal-Mart, Inc.222 No matter how seductive Wal-Mart, Inc.'s low
prices are, to permit such a concentration of power in the hands of
one company is "destructive of the public welfare" and will
culminate23 in nothing less than market tyranny - grinding market
tyranny.2

Nonetheless, before the Wal-Martization of America can be
addressed under the Sherman Antitrust Act, and before a proper
remedy can be tailored to curb its progression,224 change must ring
219. See Piraino, supra note 156, at 1182 (2005) (arguing through a
hypothetical but realistic scenario that the benefit to consumers of Wal-Mart,
Inc.'s low prices outweighs any harmful effects the firm has on competition);
Bianco & Zellner, supra note 8 (quoting Harry Frist, professor of law at New
York University: "When Wal-Mart comes in and people desert downtown
because they like the selection and the low prices, it's hard for people in the
antitrust community to say we should not let them do that.").
220. See supra Part 111.2-3.
221. See supra notes 110-119 and accompanying text.
222. See supra Part III.A.
223. 21 CONG. REC. 2726 (1890). Senator Edmunds' statement in context is
revealing:
Although for the time being the sugar trust has perhaps reduced the
price of sugar, and the oil trust certainly has reduced the price of oil
immensely, that does not alter the wrong of the principle of any
trust.., because in the long run, however seductive they may appear in
lowering prices to the consumer for the time being, all human
experience and all human philosophy have proved that they are
destructive of the public welfare and come to be tyrannies, grinding
tyrannies ....
Id. A similar understanding was expressed by Representative Mason:
Some say that the trusts have made products cheaper, have reduced
prices; but if the price of oil, for instance, were reduced to [one] cent a
barrel it would not right the wrong done to the people of this country by
the 'trusts' which have destroyed legitimate competition and driven
honest men from legitimate business enterprise.
Id. at 4100.
224. The issue of proper remedy will require a level of inquiry far beyond the
scope of this paper. However, it might be useful to identify two sub-issues that
must be considered in order to formulate a remedy that will effectively
restrain the conduct of Wal-Mart, Inc. in contravention of the Sherman Act.
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throughout antitrust jurisprudence. Painted in broad strokes, the
history of antitrust jurisprudence is auspiciously aligned with the
Protectionist Camp.225 However, the Supreme Court has recently
indicated a willingness to narrow the focus of antitrust analysis
more along the lines espoused by the Efficiency Camp.226
Confronted with retail and grocery markets in which Wal-Mart,
Inc. is merely the sentinel of a form of business operation latently,
but inherently harmful to the consumer, such a move would
merely add insult to injury.2 7 Even ignoring the constitutional

First, Wal-Mart, Inc. is the world's largest business, with annual sales
approaching $300 billion. Thus, holding Wal-Mart, Inc. liable for the
maximum pecuniary damages available under sections one and two of the
Sherman Act may not serve as a sufficient deterrent to continued violation.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000) (providing a maximum monetary penalty of
$100,000,000 for corporate violators of the Sherman Act). But cf 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (2000) (providing treble damages, and attorneys' fees and costs for private
parties injured in their business or property by an antitrust violation).
Second, unlike the trusts and monopolies of the past, Wal-Mart, Inc.'s
market power derives from its operation as a single entity. Consequently,
formulating injunctive measures to prevent further violation will be more
difficult, and may ultimately require division of Wal-Mart, Inc. into separate
and independent entities in order to be effective. See United States v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 329 (1961) ("[D]ivestiture or dissolution
has traditionally been the remedy for Sherman Act violations whose heart is
intercorporate combination and control .... ."); International Boxing Club v.
United States, 358 U.S. 242, 252 (1959) (affirming the position that a
judgment formulated to remedy a violation of the Sherman Act "should (1) put
an end to the combination or conspiracy when that is itself the violation; (2)
deprive the antitrust defendants of the benefits of their conspiracy; and (3)
break up or render impotent the monopoly power which violates the Act"
(citing Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128-29 (1948))
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
225. See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
226. See California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1999). The
Court discussed with approval a method of analysis resembling a "sliding
scale" approach to challenged restraints on trade, and stated that:
[Wihat is required.., is an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the
circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint [and] [tihe object is to see
whether the experience of the market has been so clear, or necessarily
will be, that a confident conclusion about the principal tendency of a
restriction will follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of a
more sedulous one.
Id. Notably, in discussing the fact sensitive "sliding scale" approach in
California Dental, the Court cited with approval the work of Thomas A.
Piraino, Jr. See id. at 780 n.15 (citing Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of
the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1753 (1994)). As a follow up, Piraino outlined a continuum
approach "consistent with California Dental" to buyer conduct challenged
under the Sherman Act that allegedly "will prevent anti-competitive conduct
and encourage efficiency-enhancing behavior." Piraino, supra note 156, at
1127-28.
227. Moreover, placing a stamp of approval on the business philosophy of
Wal-Mart, Inc. would expedite the adoption of Wal-Martology by competitors,
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concerns intrinsic in the sidestepping by an unelected judiciary of
the non-economic values elemental in the passage of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, the adoption of an antitrust jurisprudence tailored
by the Efficiency Camp would be irresponsible in its own right.
Granting Wal-Mart, Inc. a free pass to unchecked market
domination by adopting such a formulation would hail an era of
consumer disparity overrun with negative externalities flowing
from the alleged source of consumer welfare.228 Nevertheless, the
Protectionist Camp is ill-positioned to confront Wal-Mart, Inc. and
unable to maneuver around the doctrine of everyday low prices.229
Accordingly, in order to meet the challenge presented by WalMart, Inc., reconciliation must be reached between the Efficiency
and Protectionist Camps. Yet, the need for reconciliation spurned
by Wal-Mart, Inc. represents nothing less than an opportunity for
the formulation of an antitrust jurisprudence that accords
efficiency goals a proper role while giving due regard to the noneconomic values vital to the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
The first step on the path to reconciliation entails recognition
of the market failures inherent in consumerism that make it
impossible to judge market conduct solely on the basis of consumer
preference.Specifically, two realities must be recognized: (1)
information asymmetry erects a barrier to informed choice; and (2)
consumers able to penetrate the information cost barrier are
subjected to the sharp temptation of free-riderism. In the first
instance, consumers lack sufficient information on which to base
an informed choice according to abstract preferences, thus creating
the potential for inconsistency between preference and choice.20 In
the second, individual consumers possessing individually trivial
'influence are plagued by a "What can one person do?" rationale,
often times answering: "Nothing."
This creates a group of
informed consumers making choices inconsistent with preferences
on the belief that others will advance their abstract preferences for
them. 2 ' Inevitably, the interaction of these two market failures
leads to the construction of an inaccurate picture of consumer

and speed up the race to the bottom precipitated by Wal-Mart, Inc. See supra
notes 202-203 and accompanying text.
228. See supra Part III.A.2-3.
229. See supra Part III.B.
230. See Sheehy, supra note 138, at 49-50 (arguing that information
asymmetry permits corporations to enjoy the benefits of particular conduct
while passing the costs onto the community, costs the community would

otherwise choose not to endure).
231. See Hovenkamp, supra note 87, at 26 (explaining that abstract
consumer preferences are often inconsistent with expressed consumer
preferences because consumers will often "free ride on the preferences of
others" - making purchasing decisions inconsistent with abstract preferences
- on the belief that their individual choice is insignificant in the ultimate
advancement of their abstract preferences).
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preference based on consumer choice. Thus, market conduct
cannot be adjudged by a simple inquiry into consumer preference,
because consumer conduct is fundamentally flawed.
The second step towards reconciliation derives from the first,
and requires the Efficiency Camp to abandon Judge Bork's narrow
definition of consumer welfare. 32 While this step would ostensibly
sound the death knell of the Chicago School of antitrust analysis,
this step does not require Efficiency Camp scholars to abandon
economic efficiency as the ultimate, or even exclusive goal of
antitrust law. Instead, it merely requires a broader conception of
what factors should be taken into account when calculating
allocative efficiency gains and losses.'
Rather than presuming
that prices are the only measuring stick of consumer welfare,"' a
proper formulation would consider the full panoply of consumer
values: low prices, consumer choice, small business, preventing the
concentration of social and political power, and justice in business
practices. 35' This broader conception of allocative efficiency will
permit a more acute comparison to productive efficiency. '
Moreover, it would permit the Protectionist Camp to remove
economic efficiency from a subordinate position on the list of
consumer values,237 and thus facilitate a proper consideration of
the benefits of productive efficiency by scholars within the
Protectionist Camp.2 " The ultimate result would be a calculus for
net efficiency capable of advancing consumer welfare in
accordance with the vision codified by the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Taking these steps will eliminate the line in the sand between
the Efficiency Camp and the Protectionist Camp to the benefit of
the consumer. Recognizing that United States markets frequented
by uninformed and free-riding consumers are improper forums in
which to hold "vote with your feet" elections 9 forces an important
232. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
233. Considering that allocative efficiency is synonymous, in the context of
antitrust jurisprudence, with "the welfare of society as a whole," and that all
individuals in society are consumers, it is merely a matter of course that a
broader conception of consumer welfare requires a broader conception of
allocative efficiency. See supra notes 91, 94 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text. As a practical matter,
by broadening the conception of consumer welfare beyond the narrow
consideration of prices, a definition in line with the logical import of "consumer
welfare" would be achieved. See supra note 92.
236. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 112-119 and accompanying text.
238. See 21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890) (confirming the importance of avoiding
an outright disregard of the benefits of productive efficiency, Senator Sherman

stated, "[the courts] will distinguish between lawful combinations in aid of
production and unlawful combinations to prevent competition and in restraint
of trade ....").
239. See supra notes 204-205 and accompanying text.
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concession: namely, that Congress is the only forum in which
consumer values can be ordered and defined.""0
Thus, great
deference must be given to the proxy votes cast by consumers
through their duly elected representatives. By incorporating into
a definition of consumer welfare the reality that the almighty
dollar alone cannot define abstract consumer valuations, antitrust
scholars would properly align the concept of consumer welfare
with the consumer values that inspired the Sherman Antitrust
Act. More importantly, the courts would be given a workable
concept true to the legislative intent underlying the Sherman
Antitrust Act and capable of dealing with the dangerous presence
of Wal-Mart, Inc. in the consumer market. 41
240. See Hovenkamp, supra note 87, at 30-31 (reminding scholars that the
political process is meant to give effect to majority preferences, and that
though consumer values are diverse, the political process is designed to
consider them all). Indeed, in a democratic society in which consumers
register two sets of inconsistent votes, the inconsistency must be reconciled in
favor of the democratic process. See id. at 31 (arguing that courts must
effectuate the congressional intent underlying a statute, even when the
congressional intent discounts economic values in favor of other, non-economic
consumer values).
241. While this paper offers a conceptual regime capable of addressing the
harmful latent effects of Wal-Mart, Inc. under the Sherman Act, it does not
presuppose that Wal-Mart, Inc. falls within the jurisdictional bounds of
section one and two of the Act. Two considerations are worth noting. First, it
is unlikely that Wal-Mart, Inc. actually possesses market power sufficient to
qualify it as a monopoly, and thus Wal-Mart, Inc. does not fall within the
opening clause of section two. See, e.g., Holleb & Co. v. Produce Terminal Cold
Storage Co., 532 F.2d. 29, 33 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that plaintiffs failure to
prove that defendant had a dominant market share exceeding sixty percent
precluded recovery under section two); Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co., 515 F.2d.
835, 850 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that a bottling company's ability to effectively
control only twenty-two percent of the market share was insufficient to
establish monopolization); Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d. 968, 974
(8th Cir. 1968) (holding that twenty percent market share is insufficient to
establish monopoly power). But cf. Warren S. Grimes, Buyer Power and Retail
GatekeeperPower: Protectingthe Atomistic Seller, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 563, 56364 (2005) (arguing that a retailer can exercise anticompetitive power with ten
percent or less of the market share).
Second, Wal-Mart, Inc.'s operation as a single entity ostensibly
precludes a finding of the "concerted activity" necessary to bring Wal-Mart,
Inc. under the contract, combination, or conspiracy clauses of section one and
two. See KINTNER, supra note 85, at 26 (asserting that the terms contract,
combination, and conspiracy refer generally to concerted activity). In effect,
this would remove Wal-Mart, Inc. from the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman
Act. See, e.g., Copperweld v. Independence Tube Co., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984)
(holding that a parent company is incapable of conspiring with its wholly
owned subsidiary). Nevertheless, the requisite concerted activity may be
derived from the relationships between Wal-Mart, Inc. and its suppliers. See
supra notes 143-67 and accompanying text. Whether the relationships are the
result of voluntary or coerced agreement, they are established in furtherance
of the harmful Wal-Martization of America, and thus provide the concerted
activity necessary to bring Wal-Mart, Inc. within the strictures of the
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V. CONCLUSION

To be sure, the success of Wal-Mart, Inc. in both the retail
and grocery markets is impressive beyond contention. As the
largest business in the world, there is no doubt that Wal-Mart,
Inc. represents the height of efficiency and is a model of aspiration
for all business ventures. Thus, the size of Wal-Mart, Inc. alone is
no basis for an antitrust lawsuit. However, the adverse manner in
which Wal-Mart, Inc. wields the vast power flowing naturally from
its success cannot be permitted to be clouded by the social benefit
of Wal-Mart, Inc.'s continued devotion to low prices. It is WalMart, Inc.'s abuse of power and not its size that places it in
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act:
The statement that size is not a crime is entirely correct when you
speak of it from the point of motive. But size may become such a
danger in its results to the community that the community may
have to set limits. A large part of our protective legislation consists
of prohibiting things which we find are dangerous, according to
common experience. Concentration of power has been shown to be
dangerous in democracy, even though that power may be used
beneficently.

242

Indeed, it would be unfortunate to permit such non-economic
values to be accorded secondary status and dismissed by a
commitment to efficiency.
Limiting the object of antitrust law exclusively to the
maximization of net efficiency gains may well be proper in theory,
even commendable from the perspective of free market capitalism.
However, an economic concept proper in theory is not necessarily
workable in reality. 2' The reality that consumers "are people with
many values, low prices being only one,"'" militates against
restricting the conception of consumer welfare to the maximization
of net efficiency gains. Moreover, to assert such a position flatly

Sherman Act. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 765-66 (affirming that concerted
activity may be established by a coerced agreement between defendant and
plaintiff or by a coerced agreement between defendant and third party (citing
Perma Life Mufflers v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 142 (1968))); see also
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939) (holding that
a competitor's acquiescence in a plan the ultimate consequence of which is the
unlawful restraint of trade is sufficient to establish unlawful conspiracy).
242. Louis D. BRANDEIS, THE WORDS OF JUSTICE BRANDEIS 133 (Soloman

Goldman ed., 1953).
243. For instance, the Coase Theorem, which essentially proffers that
individuals in a costless environment will resolve disputes efficiently, provides
a prime example of an economic concept proper in theory but often unworkable
in reality.
See Sheehy, supra note 138, at 20, 23-24 (noting several
assumptions on which the Coase Theorem relies which do not exist in reality,
such as implied assumptions that all individuals own property and possess
equal bargaining power).
244. Hovenkamp, supra note 87, at 20.
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ignores the reality that non-economic concerns played a central
role in the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Application of
the Efficiency Camp's Chicago School of antitrust analysis would
therefore require the courts to do nothing less than legislate from
the bench, a far cry from the authority granted to the judiciary
under Article III.

